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Abstract
Using the case-study methodology, the paper explores political mobilization of the Gorani during
the Kosovo War, which lasted from 1998 to 1999. During the Kosovo War, the Gorani, a Muslim
people, did not side with the Kosovo-Albanians, also a largely Muslim people. Nor did the
Gorani openly support the Kosovo-Serbs, with who they share a common linguistic heritage. The
purpose of this work is to answer the question why did the Gorani, who are a Muslim, Slavic
group choose their Slavic roots over their religious roots shape their political position during the
Kosovo War. After a review of the various schools of thought explaining political mobilization
of ethnic groups, e.g. the Primordialist, Instrumental, Constructivist, and Symbolic Politics
approaches, the paper accepts the Symbolic Politics approach as the one which holds the most
explanatory value. The paper concludes the Gorani has established their identity along three
main elements: religion, which an element which separates them from the Orthodox Serbs;
language, which differentiates them from the Kosovo-Albanians, and territory, an element which
links their heritage to the economic well-being. However, the Gorani did not consistently place a
significant emphasis on all three elements simultaneously. Although they clung to their religion,
they did not emphasize it. Rather, the Gorani defined their political identity around the defense
of their language and the defense of their traditional lands. In doing so, the Kosovo Albanians
came to view the Gorani as sympathizing with the Kosovo Serbs. The Gorani case thus expands
and clarifies Kaufman’s explanation of the role of Symbolic Politics in understanding ethnic
mobilization by showing that the elements of an ethnic group’s in-group political symbols vary
in importance depending on which other ethnic group is the out-group.
Key Words: Kosovo War, Serbian, Gorani, Albanian, political mobilization, ethnic identity,
ethnic conflict.

Dankaz 1
Introduction
The Kosovo region historically has hosted ethnic Albanians, Serbs and many other ethnic
groups. An important milestone in the history of the Republic of Kosovo is the 1998-1999
Kosovo War between ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs. The Kosovo Liberation Army ( UÇK,
KLA) conducted a guerrilla war against the Serbs, generating a conflict which gained

international attention for alleged ethnic cleansing and other types of war crimes. The war ended
with the intervention of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Kumanovo
Agreement between the Yugoslav and Serbian governments which left the governance of
Kosovo to the United Nations (UN). The process reached its current state then the Parliament of
Kosovo declared independence on October 17, 2008.
As sources of a conflict, some factors play a significant role, namely uneven economic
development across Kosovo, ongoing tensions between the various ethnic and religious groups,
and the fear of losing territory associated with a specific ethnic group. All of these can occur
between countries, but in the case of Kosovo, like other countries in the Balkans and Central
Europe, they occur within a country.
In the Kosovo case, both Serb and Albanian historians claim that each group’s arrival to
the region predates that of the other.1 Some local inhabitants were Christianized, and others
converted to Islam when the Ottomans took control of the region after the Battle of Kosovo in
1389.2 Both religions influenced the shaping of identities of groups in the region, and also were
the sources of conflicts which the region has had to face through the centuries. The rivalry
between Islam and Christianity manifested itself in Bosnia as well as in Kosovo. The withdrawal

1

William J Buckley, Kosovo: Contending Voice on Balkan Interventions, (Grand Rapids MI,
William B. Eerdmans Pub, 2000), p. 87
2
Ibid.
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of the Ottoman Empire in the late nineteenth century played a vital role in this regard. The
Ottoman withdrawal was followed in quick succession by the Balkan Wars and World War I.
This period of wars ended with the rise of many nation-states, including Yugoslavia as a multiethnic state, where wars and economic turmoil had created a kaleidoscope of ethnic groups, some
intermingling and others seeking to live in regions where their ethnicity dominated.
How people identify themselves or mobilize politically is important. Whether based on
religion, language, gender, social class or nationality, group identities play an important role in
governance and policy-making. Political elites use group identities to mobilize the populace.
Especially during a conflict, group identity is significant in determining the nature of the conflict.
Such is the case with the Gorani-Goranci people, an ethnic group whose language is
Slavic, but whose members profess to be Muslim. The Gorani people have historically
concentrated primarily in the southern region of Kosovo, but have immigrated throughout the
region at various times in their history. The Gorani people can be found in what are today
Albania, Bulgaria, Serbia, Bosnia and even as far as Romania.
As inhabitants of the southern region of Kosovo, the Gorani, from a scholarly
perspective, played an interesting role during the Kosovo conflict. Like the Serbs, the Gorani are
ethnically Slav, but, like the Kosovo Albanians, their religion is Islam. 3 The Gorani bear
similarities to the Bosniaks, who, although ethnically Slav, adhere to Islam. Naturally, the Serbs
are Christian, specifically Serbian Orthodox. In the 1992-1996 Bosnian conflict, religious
identification was one of the many reasons for the Serb massacre of the Bosniaks. Serb elites
mobilized ethnic Serbs to war against their Bosnian neighbors in the name of religion. However,

3

Ger Duijzings, Religion and the Politics of Identity in Kosovo, (London: C. Hurst Pub, 2000), p.
26-27
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during the Kosovo conflict, the Serbs did not direct their rage at the Gorani. Even more
interesting, the Gorani people remained largely neutral and, by not cooperating with their
Kosovo Albanian neighbors, their Muslim brethren, they seemed to side with the Serbs during
the Kosovo conflict in 1998-1999.
Accordingly, the main objective of this work is to determine why the Gorani peoples’
mobilization was based on their Slavic ethnicity and not on their religion during the Kosovo
War. The research seeks to explore the theoretical roots of group mobilization and to ascertain
why the Gorani, who knew of Serb atrocities against the Bosniaks, chose not to ally with the
Kosovo-Albanians, a predominantly Muslim group which justified its fight against Slobodan
Milosevic’s forces largely as another instance of Serbian ethnic cleansing of Muslims.
The first section of the work will explain group identity and will explore the four schools
of thought regarding ethnic mobilization: the Primordialists, Instrumentalists, Constructivists and
Symbolic Politics theorists. The source of ethnic conflict, according to each of the four schools
of thought, will also be described. Besides the theories of ethnic mobilization, theories
explaining religious mobilization will also be explained.
The second section, focusing on the Muslim minorities in the former Yugoslavia, will be
followed by a brief history of the Gorani people and the Gora region. After some general
information about the Gorani people, within the context of the Symbolic Politics theory, the
symbols which mobilize the Gorani community will be analyzed.
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1. Why Do People Mobilize?
1.1. Definition of Terms
To understand theories of ethnic and religious mobilization, a common understanding of
key basic terms, e.g. identity, ethnicity, and nationality is necessary. The Merriam-Webster
provides three definitions for identity: oneness, individuality and identification. Oneness is
defined as “sameness of essential or generic character in different instances.” Individuality is
defined as “the distinguishing character or personality of an individual;” identification is defined
as “the relation established by psychological identification.”4
In terms of individuality, identity might be a nation’s traits which distinguish it from
those of other nations. Generally, people define their identity in terms of their relationships with
others. Stephen Reicher, however, describes identity as “on the subordinate or personal level
(where my self is what makes “I” distinct from “you”); on the intermediate level or social level
(what makes “us” distinct from “them”); and on the superordinate or human level (what makes
people distinct from non-humans).”5
So identity best follows what Reicher describes succinctly as what distinguishes “they”
from “us” or the “in-group” from the “out-group.” Identity is how an individual or a group
establishes a sense of community, of oneness among themselves, and sets them apart. Identity is
a source of unity, a unity which can harvest peace or sow conflict with the “out-group.”

4

https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/identity (Access date:06/15/2017).
Stephen Reicher, Nick Hopkins, Mark Levine, Rakshi Rath, “Entrepreneurs of Hate and
Entrepreneurs of Solidarity: Social Identity As a Basis for mass Communication”, International
Review of the red Cross, Volume 87, Issue, 869, (2005): p. 622.
5
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The second question is: What is the ethnicity? Scholars have answered the question very
differently. Nelson Kasfir explains that “The individual's choice may be fundamentally ethnic,
class, religious, or - it is worth stressing - a combination of these identities.”6 Olzak points out
that ethnicity studies accepted ethnicity as an “underlying and fundamental set of ascriptive
characteristics that form a basis of collective sentiment, and under some conditions, collective
action.”7 However, the author also states that the understanding of ethnicity has changed recently
with the influence of Marxist assumptions regarding the nature of class and class conflict.8 The
latter refers to the conflict between economic classes in industrial society. The second type of
theories about ethnicity is “boundary makers” which refer to boundaries such as race, language,
shared common culture or symbolic meanings within the ethnic culture.9 Newer interpretations
of the term relate to ‘socially and politically constructed boundaries,’ for example skin color or
territory sovereignty that played roles in the manufacturing economy. 10
The term “nationality,” which is closely related to ethnicity, needs clarification. “Ethnic
group” and “nation” differ in terms of overlapping concept.11 Anthony Smith maintains that an
ethnic group “needs a group name, an accepted common heritage, common history, fundamental
elements of common culture for instance religion or language, and a land.”12 However, a nation

Nelson Kasfir, “Explaining the Political Participation”, World Politics, Volume 31, No 3,
(1979): p. 365.
7
Susan Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” Annual Review of Sociology Volume 9
(1983) p. 356.
8
Ibid.
9
Frederik Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Cultural
Difference, (Long Grove IL: Wave Land Pub.,1998), p.11.
10
Olzak, “Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization,” p.356.
11
Stuart J Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War, (Ithaca and London,
Cornell University Press, 2001), p.15-16.
12
Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Ethnic Nations, (New York NY: B. Blackwell
publications,1987), p. 22-28.
6
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differs from an ethnic group that is a “socially mobilized group that wants political selfdetermination.”13 Therefore, “not all nations are ethnic groups and not all ethnic groups are
nations”14
1.2. Group Identity and Group Mobilization
People identify with various factors which are important to them in a certain context, and
that shape their level of abstraction.15 In terms of ethnic group definition, “formed along ethnic,
racial, religious, regional, or class lines, they have distinct origins and appeals, but they share
common features.”16 However, any kind of conflict puts pressure on people involved the conflict
to identify themselves with one side or the other.17 This categorization is a quick, natural and
emotional progress that requires little effort from the people. It will automatically occur, to create
a sensible environment by creating categories based on general understandings. 18 Selfcategorization is important because “it makes collective behavior possible.”19
In the field of social psychology, scientists have done many studies on why human
behavior is politically mobilized and becomes violent. For example, one experiment on
“conformity” and “obedience” demonstrated that people can be influenced by a small group and

13

Kaufman, Modern Hatreds, p.16.
Ibid.
15
Marc Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,
2017), p.113.
16
John F McCauley, “The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa,”
American Political Social Review Volume 108 Issue 4, (2014): p.803.
17
Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p.112.
18
Ibid, p.113.
19
Ibid, p.114 Marc Sageman also writes that even loners think themselves as a part of larger
community, “they view themselves as interchangeable members of their social group: one’s own
personal and individual identity does not come to mind since it is not relevant in that situation.”
The author categorizes that process as “personalization” being a team member, rather than
individual player.
14
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would become horrible killers when they were urged to do so.20 Another example showed that
when a social role is given to a normal young man, it may transform him into a sadistic prison
guard or into a hopeless prisoner.21 Such examples demonstrate that people’s behaviors can be
strikingly influenced by the power of the situation, and they would not even be aware of it.22
Besides individual mobilization, people may mobilize as a group, for example as an ethnic
group, as political party members, or as striking factory workers seeking better economic
conditions, etc. First to be explained is group identity, its sources, and when they become
political; then will follow mobilization of established identity, and that as a pattern of political
violence.
History has many examples of bloody conflicts, and many individuals have sacrificed
themselves for the sake of honor, have fought to provide some benefit for the group to which
they belonged, e.g., their kin, ethnic group, nation, or class. 23 All those individuals’ behaviors
have been explained as “collective action” in favor of a relevant group. 24 Within this context,
Russell Hardin establishes group identity on “self-interest,” and although the author points out
that nationalist or ethnic commitments could be idealistic motivations, there might be individual
interest in these idealistic motivations, because “the benefit is often likely to be collectively
provided but individually distributed.”25 Moses Shayo uses the term “social identification” and

20

Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p. 111.
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Russell Hardin, One for All, The Logic of Group Conflict, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1995): p.4.
24
Ibid.
25
Ibid. p.50.
21
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defines it “in terms of preferences: to identify with different groups means to have different
preferences over outcomes.”26
From a psychological perspective, social identity theory helps to explain how people
decide to be in one group but not the other. Michael Hogg refers to social identity an “evaluative
definition of self in terms of group-defining attributes, and was viewed as the bridging process
between collective phenomena and individual social cognition and behavior.”27 The earlier
formulation of the theory was that of Henri Tajfel, who established his ideas on “how societal
beliefs about the relationships between groups guide members of particular group in pursuing a
positive sense of distinctiveness for their own group and thus for themselves.”28 Subsequently,
researchers separated “the self-categorization component from the self-esteem (evaluative) and
commitment (psychological) components in order to empirically investigate the relationships
among them.”29 An approach of social identity theory sees group membership as the “central
feature of individual identity” 30 and argues that significant changes over salience identities can
modify choices over policy. People identify with a potentially prominent group; thus, the
identification has two factors that display “similarity in relevant features and status of the
group,” and the group members’ behavior is consistent with the larger group’s interests. 31 In

Moses Shayo, “A Model of Social Identity with an Application to Political Economy: Nation,
Class, and Redistribution,” The American Political Science Review Volume 103, No 2, (2009):
p.147.
27
Michael A Hogg, Cecilia L Ridgeway, “Social Identity: Sociological and Social Psychological
Perspectives,” Social Psychology Quarterly Volume 66 No 2, (2003): p.97.
28
Ibid.
29
Jan E Stets, Peter J Burke, “Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory,” Social Psychology
Quarterly, Volume 63 No 3, (2000): p.225.
30
McCauley, “The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa,” p, 803
31
Ibid. The author gives an example that in terms of national and class identities, the tax rate
decided by a poor citizen, is lower, based on how the citizen identity herself, “if she identifies
with the nation than if she identifies with her class.”
26
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terms of national and ethnic identities, while factors such as the acquisition of indispensable
resources promote the status of nations, those are also strengthening ties to the national identity
over ties to ethnicity. 32 Consequently, the varied sources of group identity might be based on
ethnic or clan relations, gender, family, race, and there also could be an economic base. In this
work, it will be accepted that the source of group identity is ethnicity.
People’s behaviors can turn violent during a conflict. Political violence is the result of a
conflict in which one side are protesters and the other side is generally the state. The result of the
conflict between protestors and the state is escalation into violence.33 Sageman points out that
social identity is at the center of the process of turning politically violent. 34 Not only during a
conflict do people identify themselves with a group. Self-categorization is a natural, emotional,
and automatic process intended to make life simpler, based on common ground realities. 35
However, in certain contexts people may have several identities. For example, humankind vs.
animals in the context of creatures. Even within the group, some form a sub-group. Other
examples are an individual identifying himself with a nation, particularly during an international
conflict, or a single person versus other people. This natural and basic categorization is capable
of creating prejudice or “namely, in-group favoritism and out-group denigration,” and
accordingly that self-categorization leads to increased differences over intra-group.36

32

Ibid.
Andy Martens, Raazzesh Sainudiin, Chris Sibley, Jeff Schimel, David Webber, “Terrorist
Attacks Escalate in Frequency and Fatalities Preceding Highly Lethal Attacks,” Plos One, 2014
p.1-2 ‘violence is escalation of conflict’
34
Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p. 113.
35
Ibid.
36
Ibid. p. 115.
33
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People can see themselves in a larger social group and as “interchangeable” group
members within their social group, which is the case with one who does not consider his/her own
self and with one whose individual identity falls astern of the group’s identity, such as a team’s.
Individual players think as team members. This process is called “depersonalization -- being a
team member rather than an individual player.” Teammates are in-group members opposing
other in-group members, their opponents, who are not seen as individual players but simply as
members of the opposing team, an “out-group.”37
Within the example of team member phenomena, any kind of dangerous movements for
the team or injury to one of the team players is accepted as if occurring against the whole team.
Likewise, each team member becomes involved in political violence not because of personal, but
because of group motives. This is “normal, natural, automatic and direct consequence of the
everyday process of categorizing oneself as a member of a group, or in terms of group identity:
one’s identity is the group identity.” 38 Social identities are our cumulative identities from social
groups of which we are members, and it must be noted that identities are plural; a person may
belong to several social groups based on gender, nationality, club membership, family, friends,
etc. These social group identities might be salient depending upon the context. 39 Sageman writes
that “Social categories are not fixed, absolute properties of the observer but are relative, fluid,
and context dependent. Activation of a particular category is contextual: it reflects the relevant
concern at the time and conforms to the three principles of meta-contrast, availability, and fitness

37

Ibid. The author writes that self- categorization makes collective behavior, and this process of
depersonalization makes group phenomena possible.
38
Ibid.
39
Reicher Stephen, Hopkins Nick, Levine Mark, Rath Rakshi, “Entrepreneurs of Hate and
Entrepreneurs of Solidarity: Social Identity As a Basis for mass Communication,” p. 624.
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to this context.”40 If aggression by an out-group occurs against one of the group members, group
identity immediately escalates in salience and significance. In a certain situation, people selfcategorize themselves with a particular group because they have more in common with in-group
members than with other groups. That is called the meta-contrast principle, by which individual
differences are less important within the in-group than are the differences between in-group and
out-group members.41
In sum, people self-categorize themselves and view themselves as a part of a larger
group. Members of the group demonstrate more trust in and respect for other group members,
and seek cooperation and provide opportunities, which establishes a sense of belonging. 42 People
see themselves in various social groups and view world events in terms of their importance to
their group and group members, rather than to a person as an individual.43
After the creation of social identity, the next step is “creating an imagined community
and activation of a politicized identity.” 44 Actors of politicized social identity do not see
themselves as political at the beginning. Here it should be highlighted that politicized social
identities divide into two groups: one is serious political grievance, the other is non-political
grievance like that of students, workers, citizens. If demonstrators are suppressed by police
forces during peaceful protests, then protests turn political. It is important to note that the
original motivation of the protest loses its importance in the face of violence following the
repression of the demonstrators. That repression then leads to the activation of politicized, anti-

40

Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p. 116.
Ibid. The author adds also that self-categorization always occurs in opposition to an out group.
42
Ibid.
43
Reicher Stephen, Hopkins Nick, Levine Mark, Rath Rakshi, “Entrepreneurs of Hate and
Entrepreneurs of Solidarity: Social Identity As a Basis for mass Communication,” p. 624.
44
Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p.117-130.
41
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state social identity. Furthermore, police intervention in response to peaceful protests causes
shock to potential members of the group, and they will switch their positions from neutral
observers into threatened members of the group. On a larger scale, mass media and internet 45 are
playing active and vital roles, because when the public sees aggression against one group,
whether right or not, they self-categorize into an imagined community. This self-categorization
into politicized social identity then changes from personal to political.
During a conflict with an out-group, generally a state, police intervention leads to
disillusion, failure of peaceful demonstrations and moral outrage. Some in-group members start
thinking of themselves as soldiers who are protecting their political community. “This second
self-categorization, into martial social identity, leads a few to turn to violence in defense of their
imagined community.”46
After individuals have categorized themselves, the second step is collective actions.
Shared group identity is getting stronger, and the relationship among in-group members opens a
communication stage which enables coordinated and effective collective action. Hence, in-group
members start to trust each other more, co-operate, help, respect other group members, and most
likely seek agreement with in-group members. All these cooperative factors lead to an increase
of organizational efficiency. 47 The strong social identity makes “leadership possible.” 48

45

Internet has a vital role in activation of politicized identification, and it is also playing an
important role in collection of people for imagined politicized community.
46
Ibid, p. 117.
47
Reicher Stephen, Hopkins Nick, Levine Mark, Rath Rakshi, “Entrepreneurs of Hate and
Entrepreneurs of Solidarity: Social Identity As a Basis for mass Communication”, p. 624.
48
Ibid, p. 625.
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The group who established an identity is not violent; they are just some political
protestors.49 The conflict between in-group and out-group approaches violence following the
disappointment after the failed, nonviolent legal approaches and moral outrage. 50 According to
the Sageman, people precipitate political protests. In other words, people side themselves with a
group, and that leads to recognition that the other protestors are holding the same identity. 51 This
process leads to solidification in the group, which increases confidence to resist and make more
claims against the out-groups. He describes the process of transition from non-violent to violent
within the context of the escalation of conflict. The perceptions of each group toward the other
change, and out-group reactions start to be seen as hostile.52 The transition process is important
because the in-group creates their norms based on the violent other group’s hostile perception.
While physical escalation of conflict is increasing, the used language of both sides helps to
increase the tension. Each group blames its out-group for the extremist speeches. This situation is
fed by the sensationalist media, and this extremist talk prevails within out-group extremism and
gives support to in-group extremism activities. Furthermore, extremist speech is the main
justification of in-group hatred of its enemy. Leaders of in-groups and out-groups use the hatred
to motivate neutral members and denigrate them as rivals as though they are part of the outgroup, unwilling to protect the in-group with the exaggeration of the threat and danger of its outgroup. It should be highlighted that hate speech is not enough to start violence but it is one of the
important factors for violence.

49

Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p. 130.
Ibid.
51
Ibid.
52
Ibid, the Following part source is Sageman, Misunderstanding Terrorism, p.130-150.
50
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Another factor of violence is “disillusionment with nonviolent tactics.” People who have
weak social identity are not going to sacrifice anything for the group. Those are “free riders” and
they leave action for the activist. When it is time for reform in the group, they quickly lose their
interest and leave the group. Moderate members of the group are more willing to give some time,
effort and resources for their group. They try to fix group grievances, can criticize ineffective
group leaders; “just talk, talk, talk – and nothing happens.” Feeling disappointment, they also
leave the group and fade away. Later, they also become free riders. However, for those who gave
so much time, sacrificed many things for the group, they have increased their activism, including
more extreme and maybe illegal activities.
As with hate speech, disappointment with the nonviolent tactics is not enough to
politicize people to turn to violence as well. Generally, an unexpected and horrifying incident
occurs, with out-group against in-group. The aggression of out-group is perceived by in-group
members as an attack on all group members. The attacked group shows strong moral outrage
toward the out-group attackers, and starts seeking punishment. At this level, emotions are
playing an important role in the turn to political violence. As mentioned previously, people may
hold different social identities at the same time, but some of those might be latent identities.
However, the identity which has to face the aggression, becomes salient due to the attack, and
those moderates or free riders may become either in-group or out-group sympathizers, or even
become a member of either group. To summarize, many people become politicized by the
aggression, and their new, politicized and triggered identity gives them a role: they have become
part of an active political group. Another important factor that causes moral outrage is aggression
against symbols of social identity, such as burning religious books, state flags, writings or
drawings that insult emblematic figures of either group. Consequently, out-group aggression
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against in-group affects in-group perspective, convincing in-group that its social world is in
danger and the group needs to be defended. Within this context, any small step for self-defense
may change the perception of violent limits. Therefore, one small step may lead to horrifying
violence.
The final level is activation of a martial social identity. Through out-group threats and
attacks, a few within the in-group become volunteers to defend their imagined community
without seeking possible legal ways. At this point, the small, frustrated group self-categorizes
itself as soldiers of the victimized in-group. With this new, martial identity, they defend their ingroup fellows against the combatant out-groups. Because this activation of martial identity
occurs unconsciously, there is not a definite moment of becoming a soldier of the group.
Generally there is no key event of identification and self-categorization, but the members with
the activated, martial identity at some point view themselves as soldiers who are fighting for
fellow group members and a cause. Based on this perspective, activated martial social identity
justifies its political violence because those culprits are soldiers of the imagined community and
are defending the imagined community. It is natural for a soldier to fight; violence is basically
what soldiers practice. The shift from activist in-group to martial identity means that violence is
around the corner, because people with the martial social identity are more likely to act out,
based on what they believe they are.
1.3 Ethnic Mobilization
During any conflict, people categorize themselves within one group against the other, but
what are the factors that allow ethnic wars to occur? Stuart Kaufman categorizes reasons for
ethnic wars as ancient hatreds, manipulative leaders, economic rivalry, spiral of insecurity,
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symbolic politics, and mass-led or elite-led mobilizations.53 One important factor is the theory of
‘ancient hatreds,’ that hatred stems from ancient roots, and traces back to historical legends. 54
One example of the ancient hatreds: during the Srebrenica massacre, Serb General Ratko Mladic
made the following statement for the Bosniak Serb channel: “Here we are in Srebrenica on the
eleventh of July 1995, on the eve of yet another great Serbian holiday. We present this city to the
Serbs as a gift. Finally, after the rebellion against the dahis, the time has come to take revenge on
the Turks in this region.”55 However, culture is also playing an important role in keeping
generations connected. People pass down hatred from one generation to the next within epic
poems, songs, etc., because this process is necessary in order to not to forget and to become an
‘ancient’.56
The second factor of the ethnic wars is manipulative leaders. In this aspect, leaders are
playing an important role rather than promoting hatred, and an ethnic war is a result of the
manipulative leaders conducting policy through mass media.57 V. P. Gagnon Jr writes that
“I argue that violent conflict along ethnic cleavages is provoked by elites
in order to create a domestic political context where ethnicity is the only
politically relevant identity. It thereby constructs the individual interest of
the broader population in terms of the threat to the community defined in
ethnic terms. Such a strategy is a response by ruling elites to shifts in the
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structure of domestic political and economic power: by constructing
individual interest in terms of the threat to the group, endangered elites
can fend off domestic challengers who seek to mobilize the population
against the status quo, and can better position themselves to deal with
future challenges.”58
Kaufman summarizes that leaders of an ethnic community lead the community toward
ethnic war to gain, or keep, power for themselves.59
The third factor in the ethnic wars is economic rivalry. Ethnic groups are essentially
interest groups, and each ethnic group is a rival for the other to gain more political and economic
benefits, just like other interest groups. 60 Thus the ethnic group mobilizes itself when members
think that it is the best time to get what they want. They organize themselves in the best possible
manner to achieve their goals.61
The fourth factor for ethnic war motivation is a spiral of insecurity. Kaufman highlights
the spiral of insecurity of ethnic war that political scientists generally describe as “the structure
of the situation” and “strength of the federal government,” which means that during the conflict
of the groups, the government cannot solve the problem within the groups. Furthermore, the
government is not able to prevent fighting between the groups due to its weakness. This leads to
the groups’ self-defense idea, which leads to the groups arming themselves for protection.62
Besides the government position, if one side starts to arm themselves in a conflict, the other side
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also starts to arm its group. This leads to the case of security dilemma, which basically is an arms
race.
The fifth factor of ethnic war is Symbolic Politics theory. Despite other factors, ethnic
groups have some symbolic figures or items which have meaning in their semantic world. The
perspective explains that ethnic myths and symbols are also important for mobilization, therefore
any attack to those images, or defending/honoring could also be a reason for mobilization. The
approach of symbolism has an embracing position, because it bonds the factors of ancient
hatreds, manipulative leaders and economic rivalry. 63
While analyzing how ethnic groups react to mobilization, scholars primarily traced the
works of those who studied, analyzed and explained the rise of modern Europe.64 The first group
was inspired by Marx and Engel, hence they were analyzing ethnic groups based on capitalism,
industrial development and class struggle. The second group focused on Weber and Durkheim
works which seek answers based on modernization, organization and culture.65
1.4 Theories of Ethnic Group Mobilization
There are many approaches about ethnic group mobilization, and there are broadly two main
approaches regarding ethnic mobilization. As Stuart J. Kaufman is drawing a fundamental frame
for ethnic theories. He categorizes two main approaches: primarily, dividing into two main
parts: “rational choice” and “emotional choice.”66 Under the these two main approaches, there
are four schools of thought. These schools are “Primordialists,” “Instrumentalists,”
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“Constructivists,” and “Symbolic Politics.” However, it should be highlighted that these schools
of thought are not strictly divided with clear borders.
Rational choice approach mainly explains ethnic mobilization with rational attempts to
collect limited economic sources.67 Rational choice approaches divide two sub-approaches: first,
ethnic group as instrumental, second, rationalist theories of ethnic war.68 The first school of
thought, the “Instrumentalist,” defines ethnic groups as simple unions, and these groups have
aimed to compete for limited goods in the context of social changes due to modernization. 69
Kaufman gives an example of instrumentalist school of thought for ethnic conflict in Africa that
“often essentially conflicts between ethnically defined patron-client networks over economic
goods distributed by state.”70 According to this school ethnic nations formed in the last two
centuries, national language is selected among different dialects, and written language is created
as basic for country’s literature in certain states.71 This is a vital step in terms of establishing a
group identity with selected language within the group. For the groups using dialect different
than the chosen one, they establish a new literacy, 72 therefore creating a new ethnic group.73 The
created identity with new language mobilizes to gain more economic benefit. Shortly, selfinterest is the fundamental of group formation, and the group identity is established to reach to
shared interests by elites’ rational decisions. The school argues that the source of the ethnic war
is competition for resources.
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Susan Olzak’s work, Contemporary Ethnic Mobilization, explains motivation of ethnic
groups to mobilize with gaining more economic benefits. Thus, her work is more detailed in
terms of the economic situation of ethnic groups, and the work can be categorized more
Instrumentalist or more broadly, a sample work of rational choice theory. Olzak categorizes
ethnic mobilization through modernization perspective and emphasizes four major approaches:
Developmental Theories, Internal Colonialism and Cultural Division of Labor Models,
Economic Models of Ethnicity: Split and Segregated Labor Markets, Competitive Models of
Ethnic Mobilization.74
Developmental Theories refers to identification of progress in state building and nation
building. The theories view “ethnic movement as disjunction between rates of social
mobilization (for example voter participation, participation in a state education system) and
assimilation to the state-builder’s culture.”75 There are certain elements that should be present to
be ethnically mobilized that equal size ethnic groups within a state, ethnically split in the region
but relatively one is more developed than the other.
Internal Colonialism and Cultural Division of Labor Models states that there is an
internal (core) colony which is at a certain level of wealth and is culturally dominant. The
dominant colony makes use of the dominance towards other ethnically identified non-dominant
colonies (periphery). Therefore, internal colonialism tries to explain “ethnic regionalism and
regional resistance to ethnic assimilation by applying within-state settings the core-periphery
model found world-systems theory.” Olzak highlights that the conflict between core and
periphery meant “uneven development of industrialization.” The second step of the theory that
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separation of labor market by ethnic and cultural boundaries leads to a cultural division and
lower level group members’ situation causes ethnic solidarity due to their low status and lowreward occupations because ethnic solidarity will be produced by combining of common
experiences, social experiences and class-based interests.
The third step of the theories is that of Economic Models of Ethnicity: Split and
Segregated Labor Market. The theories basically say: “economic roles determine the degree to
which ethnic solidarity exists.” In this theory, there are two arguments: the theories of the split
labor market and segregated labor market. The theory draws a different line from the models of
cultural division of labor, because the previous model emphasizes the interest in ethnic
mobilization based on the “primacy class and class conflict”. However, the model accepts that
certain types of economic conditions and adaptations produce ethnic organizations and solidarity.
Olzak takes Bonacich’s model as a base which is per the theory, ethnic conflict appears
when two or more ethnic groups are having competition within the same labor market but with
different wages. “Three-way competition and exploitation among majority-group owners and
higher-and-lower-priced ethnically divided labor groups” cause high levels of ethnic antagonism,
therefore in order to keep the economic interests of capitalist owners, it should be maintained as
“racially and ethnically divided labor force,” because segregation of class creates and keeps
ethnic boundaries.76 The theory counts many factors as triggers of ethnic conflict such as racism,
having prejudice about someone or some group, lynching, discrimination against someone or
group, and segregation laws.
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The second section of the economic theory explains how people keep their ethnic
boundaries through “the role of specialized economic institutions and network relations.” The
main thing is that smaller groups or ethnic groups create institutions, “kinds of insular
occupational adaptations,” or network relations in order to strengthen their customs, such as
languages, cultures, traditional rituals, and also preserve cultural assimilation by dominant
culture.77
Olzak’s last model about ethnic mobilization is the Competitive Models of Ethnic
Mobilization. The theory’s perspective is that ethnic groups focus on one labor market, and
obtain more economical, political and social resources, and then ethnic mobilization will take
place. The theory tries to answer the question: “Why does mobilization take place along ethnic
groups rather than class, kindship, occupational, or other lines of cleavages?” Per the theory, race
and ethnicity depend on situations, which means ethnicity is chosen by individual people based
on result of their choice’s advantages or disadvantages and abilities of a set of chosen things in
life that provide ethnic boundaries. Competition theory also claims that economic and state
modernization helped increase ethnic mobilization based upon identity. This new selfidentification based on these two factors, leads to reorganizing in favor of larger groups rather
than kindship, village, or other smaller scale boundaries. Different world systems underlined
terms of organization, power, negotiation only among the nation state. That, especially after
World War II, led to the increase of nation-state movement, the idea of self-determination and
sovereignty. From this perspective, the theory claims that there are connections between
modernization and ethnic mobilization in terms of increasing ethnic mobilization and subnational
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and territorial ethnic movements. Competitive theory explains four steps to complete from basis:
urbanization, industrialization of the labor force, expansion of the political sector and the final
step, independence from the empire or colonial power.
Kaufman notes that rationalist choice theoreticians have produced many theories,
including the instrumentalists school. However, Kaufman focuses on three important subbranches of theories. The first of the rationalist choice approaches is economic rivalry, which is
the approach that primarily addresses economic concerns on various levels. Firstly, one of the
main economic concerns is distribution. Poorer regions may unify against a central government
because they believe that the central government discriminated against them. Symmetrically
richer areas may also want to leave because they do not want to carry the poorer areas’ economic
responsibilities with the union. At this point, Kaufman notes that such a factor has very limited
influence, based on statistical studies. Furthermore, the theory cannot explain the general ethnic
mobilization. However, analysts found that ethnic group mobilization occurs “under virtually all
economic circumstances.”78 The second level of the economic theory is the “relative
deprivation” and “especially decreases in life standards.” Those deprived regions and groups
may ethnically mobilize against the government, but as Kaufman demonstrates by examples of
Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, both had serious decreases of life standards before both states
collapsed. He also writes that Tajikistan is a good example of relative deprivation. The country
had the second worst economic situation, and had to face a civil war, but the conflict was not an
ethnic conflict. On the other hand, Armenia and Georgia had ethnic conflicts, but their economic
situations improved, relative to Russia, before the conflicts occurred.79
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The second rational choice theory is the hard-rationalist theory, which tries to step away
from instrumentalist understanding. This approach sees ethnic war as “a function of individuals’
rational pursuit not of material benefits, but of personal security.” 80 The theory argues that in
case of “emergent anarchy,” and when the state is not capable of providing protection for the
people from violence, rational groups begin to mobilize to preemptive self-defense.81
If there is going to be violence in a conflict, people may increase their survival chances if
suppression is successful over the other group in the conflict by preemptively attacking before
them, which is “I sneak up on you, before you sneak upon me.” 82 Self-defense against even a
possible attack, will be enough to motivate slaughterhouse conflict.83
The mechanism of the mobilization is called a “tipping process” driven by peer
pressure.84 If an increasing number of people are joining ethnic mobilization, they can put more
pressure on others to join. It is worth joining because a growing activity is likely to succeed. 85
Another argument of the approach Kaufman highlights is it “relies on selective
incentives.” That means that people gets involved in ethnic conflict because they have been told
they will get a reward for killing others, or be threatened with death if they do not kill.
The last argument of the rational choice approach is the soft rationalist theory. This
approach argues that the main reason for ethnic violence is that an extremist group values and
builds on that assumption. In this model, rationality prefers to pursue the goals defined by
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nationalist ideology. In this theory, it is easier for people to participate in ethnic movements
because nationalist values can be used as explanations of people’s behavior. Kaufman gives an
example that a group has extreme preferences, and that group wants to dominate the whole
group, even if it is very risky, just as it is most likely that extremist politicians will overcome
moderates. Consequently, once extremist politicians are in power, they will use the government
branches to organize enthusiastic followers for war.86
1.5 Emotional Choice
The second approach to understanding ethnic mobilization is based on theories focusing
on group members’ emotional choices. The emotional choice approach includes three theoretical
schools of thought. They are Primordialism, Constructivism and Symbolic Politics.
Broadly, contrary to the Rational Choice approach, emotional choice theorists contend
that individuals’ reactions to events are rooted in emotional ties unrelated to utilitarian benefit.
Essemtally, emotional choice theorists contend individuals face many choices and the amount of
information is too vast for them to identify a clear gain-loss choice. In order to simplify their
decision-making, individuals use historical references and traditions to understand and simplify
an otherwise complex reality.
The first school of thought, Primordialism, refers to more ethno-mythology. This refers
to an ethnic group that has existed for a long time and “has always yearned for a country of its
own.”87 In this case, group identity is playing an important role. Social life begins with each

Ibid, p. 22. The author also highlights that “when preferences are extreme, a ‘softer’ version
of the Hardin’s tipping argument can also be used to explain ethnic wars that start from the
bottom up, without government help.”
87
Ibid, p. 4.
86

Dankaz 26
individual’s origins, and when a group establishes social identity, that starts from child rearing.
That “is a way or method by which a group’s basic way of organizing experience (it is group
identity as we noted)88 maintained over generations. Development through life’s stages produces
“a defined ego within a social reality (…) or “identity” that connotes both a persistent sameness
within oneself (selfsameness) and a persistent sharing of some essential characteristic with
others.”89 For most people, group identity is assigned from birth, and mostly it has signs such as
racial characteristics as well as being marked by circumcision, tattoo, or other artificial process. 90
Our mother languages provide words, which is a “conceptual lens” to understand the world and
religion. This is another important factor to shape values and identities; those factors are playing
a significant role in our wishes and needs.91 Based on this logic, strong ethnic consciousness
stamps “some fundamental biological drives such as defense of kin and territory.” 92
Primordialists identify the cause of ethnic war as historical rivalry or a historical custom.
Those historical conflicts between primordial ethnic groups will re-appear someday and cause
yet another conflict between the ethnic groups. Kaufman highlights that ethnic nationalism is a
modern ideology, and such history or kinship ties are generally symbolic. Therefore, national
identities can be hardly primordial. For example, many countries’ identities in eastern Europe are
new. Before their independence, the peasants of the Balkans and the south Caucasus did not
identify themselves as “Croats,” “Georgians,” “Azerbaijanis.” Hence, “they were convinced to
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adopt these identities on the bases of shared language, religion, and historical mythology in the
twentieth century.” 93
The second set of schools of thought, the Constructivist perspective, refers to a set of
ideas, such as who is included in the ethnic group, what its values are, etc. and these identities
from a constructivist view are generally created or interpreted by the ethnic or nationalist
intellectuals. The process of ethnic identity building, which is creating ethnic labels, literary
language, etc., is led by outsiders in some parts of Africa and the Soviet Union. Sometimes
identities are created from whole cloth by those intellectuals. After creating ethnic labels, the
second step is accepting and internalizing that by groups after governments apply the label to
them. Primordialists and instrumentalists have accepted the fundamental point of
constructivism.94
The Constructivist school of thought points out that “there is a limit to the plasticity of
ethnic identity.” While constructing an ethnic identity, intellectuals can invent, re-invent or hide
the groups’ past, but there is a certain thing that they must use as a foundation to build upon,
such as language, culture, religion and a land. “Nations are requiring ethnic cores if they are to
survive. If they lack one, they must ‘re-invent’ one. That means discovering a suitable and
convincing past which can be reconstructed and re-presented to members and outsiders.”95 As
mentioned earlier, when constructing an ethnic identity, the intellectuals needed “a name and
cluster of cultural elements to a history and mythology that create ethnic symbols and give
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responses to the group needs.” That means ethnic groups are neither forever and fixed nor
extremely workable.96 Not well-maintained national identities do not survive such as Yugoslavia.
The final set of theories are those of the Political Symbolists. The Political symbolists
contend that while they are creating nationalist identities, ethnic elites generally create some
symbols such as flags, emotional moments, and cite some key figures from the society to trigger
their mobilization. For example, they highlight “motherland” to establish the understanding of
home, the certain territory in order to defend the “home.”97 Basically, besides Primordialist and
Constructivist perspectives on ethnicity, political symbolism defines the core of ethnic identity as
consisting of myths, values, memories, and symbols. 98 All these factors explain who the group
members are and also what it means to be a member of the group. 99 The main assumption of the
political symbolism is that when people make a political decision, they are not always rational.
People also make decisions according to their emotions, in order to fit the symbols which are
created by ethnic and nationalist leaders. In terms of defending the group symbols which have
symbolic meanings in their nationalist semantic world, the group members are willing to fight
and even die for those symbols. 100 Based on this perspective, people follow the leaders who
manipulate those symbols, but some leaders misuse and manipulate the symbols for selfish
purposes.101
The Political Symbolists explain the reasons for the ethnic war with the symbols created
by manipulative leaders to defend the group. The leaders also can be manipulative, with hidden
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aims to reach. As explained previously, four schools of thought provide different explanations of
ethnic mobilization, but there are also some common areas that merge with other schools of
thought.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Appendix A, according to the Constructivists and the Symbolic
Politics theorists, people make decisions not always logically but also emotionally. People’s
decisions are based on such elements that they do not have economical value. Even land, from
which people gain economic benefit, also has an emotional value. The land is rooted to the
heritage of the peoples. More than where a people raises its crops, the land is where the people
place the birthplace and the graves of their relatives. Losing the land means losing their heritage.
On the other hand, the Instrumentalists and Rationalists place the emphasis for people’s
choices on the utility which people gain from keeping, maintaining or losing control of their
well-being or their sources of livelihood. The Rational Choice Approach holds a very cynical
view of human nature. Individuals act mainly on the basis of a cost-benefit analysis.
In the common area, where the Constructivist school exist, people base their group
identity as much on rational choices as emotional choices. During the creation of new ethic
identity, there should be a strong group identity. Depending on the group identity, there should
be elements which people would sacrifice themselves for those symbolic elements. If there is a
lack of symbolic elements, people’s unification may fade away when they understand that they
cannot reach economic benefits.
When then does their sense of ethnic identity lead ethnic groups conduct an ethnic war?
Kaufman categorizes the necessary conditions for an ethnic war with “myth justifying ethnic
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hostility, ethnic fear, and an opportunity to mobilize.102 It should be highlighted that these
conditions are necessary but not sufficient by themselves.
First, the justification of ethnic hostility with myth is when a group views its aggression
against the other group with a hostile myth. For instance, people mobilize in order to respond to
those ethnic symbols, for example a group of people which accepts territory as a homeland
which definitely must be protected from its enemies. Kaufman gives an example that myth of
Serbian martyrdom had been established based on the Battle of Kosovo 1389, and the myth
reflected as the slogan, “Only unity saves the Serbs,” justified Serb hostility against the Bosniaks
and Kosovo-Albanians.103
The fear of ethnic extinction is another important reason for the groups to mobilize, not
only one side, but for both side to mobilize, because it turns into a security dilemma. When an
ethnic group has a fear of ethnic extinction, it justifies violent actions against the out-group and
also significantly increases its own self-defense. In this case, the source of the fear is picturing
the in-group as always under threat and aggrieved.
The other factor that leads to increase of fear is demographically being under the
dominance by another ethnic group. Therefore, demographic threats might be motivation of
ethnic fear which leads to ethnic war. Another perspective on fear is that losing national identity
also may motivate to ethnic mobilization.
While all these factors are necessary, they not sufficient by themselves. There must be an
opportunity for ethnic groups to conduct their mobilization, often referred to as a “political
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opening.” An ethnic group must have some freedom to meet, to attract followers, and to
organize. There must be a degree of freedom of assembly and freedom of expression. 104 That
freedom cannot be restricted by government forces. Otherwise, governments’ effective policy, be
it police arrests, restrictions on free assembly, or other Draconian measures, will prevent
mobilization.
After all the necessary elements for ethnic war are present, how does the process work?
According to Kaufman, a new incident occurs which activate myths, triggering increasing fear
and hostility.105 For example, a claim that a group attacked by the other or waving a group’s flag
under influence of manipulative leader. If the case of fear and hostility is already high level, new
opportunities show up for political solutions such as “reforming leader.”106
Based on Kaufman’s Political Symbolist theory, when hostile myths are present and there
is a political opening, a triggering incident leads to mobilize as mass. This process is called
mass-led ethnic mobilization.107 Within the mass-led group, likely there are many true believers
and fanatics in the group. In mass-led mobilization political leaders try to support the
mobilization by their chauvinistic action toward symbolic elements, even though these activities
are illicit to eye of the government.
Some ethnic mobilizations are also elite-led. In the case of elite-led ethnic mobilizations,
powerful elites, often government officials, harness ethnic myths to gather popular support. The
motivations of elites can be to increase their own power within the political system or to advance
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broader political objectives. The elites make use of hostility, ethnic myths, and symbolic factors
to increase their in-group followers’ fears and hostilities against the out-group.
Given the Gorani define themselves as a Slavic Muslim people, the question is what role
religion plays in defining a group’s identity and influencing its political mobilization. As
mentioned in the previous sections, people may hold different identities. For instance, a person
can be a citizen of a country and at the same time, the person can be classified based on his/her
gender. Alongside individual identity, people also have group identities which define them with
the group value and criticize themselves based on these group values. In the case of religious
group identification, people identify themselves according to the religious factors. While a
person identifies himself/herself with a group, in-group identification is a significant condition to
indigenize and to become invisible.108 “The more important a given group is for one’s sense of
self, the more one should be inclined to consolidate that particular identity and to achieve grouprelated goals.”109
Religion as a group identity brings rise to various political priorities. Even within the
religion, these political priorities can be various. “World religious identities, such as Islam and
Christianity, are ascriptive identities yet are not determined purely by birth or lineage: members
have at least the perception that their membership in any particular group may be a matter of
choice.”110 As mentioned previously, national identity might be combined with religious
elements, but choosing a religious identity is assisted by some certain doctrines and sacred
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scriptures, unlikely ethnic group identity. 111 In this case, members do not blend their religious
identity with other elements of their ethnic identity.112 Religion becomes the defining aspect of
their in-group identity. One’s country of origin and other cultural-linguistic ties become less
important in defining group identity.
McCauley writes an interesting point that “with choice underpinned by formal doctrine
comes an implied process of ranking one’s own group against others, based on superiority.” 113
He also writes that this brings a division in the religious concept, which is different from the
divisions between groups in the ethnic concept, and this especially plays an important role that
“the given role of sacred texts in the delineating priorities for religious practitioners.” 114 The
existence of a guiding scripture in the religious identity is seen very rarely in social identities and
this must lead to boost individuals in the religious context in order to spread primarily goods,
such as morality, world view, salvation and justice.
As in other types of political mobilization, religious figures, like other cultural elites, hold
an important role in political mobilization.115 And also consistent with political mobilization,
where political openings create the option for more pluralist understandings of events and issues
in the political sphere, influential religious sects may form a political organization and will adopt
a political agenda. Religious mobilizations, like ethnic mobilizations, have occurred where
religious minorities have been marginalized or perceived to have been marginalized due to their
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beliefs, which are the heart of their political myths. Religious principles are also an alternative
source of group identity as a group views secular philosophies such as nationalism, communism,
socialism, and liberalism have failed to address past injustices. Religious organizations not only
will establish an alternative political view, but they will also present an alternative governing
model where the state has failed. Religious parties or religious mobilizations tend to occur in
places where religious minorities have previously experienced economic or political
marginalization. 116
Religion can be then a crucial element in political mobilization. While some contend
religion is a choice, it is also part of an individual’s family lineage and group heritage. Hence it
is a source of group identity that interacts with other social elements such as race, ethnicity,
social strata, economic class, and historic region in defining a group’s political identity. 117
Depending on how a group seeks to define itself, it can place religion as the primary defining
element, in which case it creates a cleavage separating it from other societal groups.118 On the
other hand, a group, as illustrated in the case of the Gorani vis-à-vis the Kosovo Albanians, can
claim another element, such as linguistic heritage or territorial integrity, as the key element in
identifying in-group and out-group members. Similarly, the affiliation of religious elements
other social elements within society, while social elements and political position may share a
common language but different religion, a similar history of domination by outside powers,
hence an intrinsic fear of being dominated, as well as historical claims to some of the same
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territory, Croatian draw on their Catholic heritage to differentiate themselves from Serbians, who
trace their uniqueness to Serbian Orthodoxy.
That said, religious affiliation has an international aspect transcending geographical and
political boundaries. Both Greece and Russia, for example, used their common Orthodox
heritage as justification for the defense of their Serbian brethren in Bosnia and Kosovo. And,
Saudi Arabia and Turkey cited their defense of their Muslim brethren based largely on their
defense of Islam against persecution.
Religious mobilization per se does not occur as a distinct phenomenon. Rather, religious
mobilization is a type of political mobilization in which religion plays the key element uniting
the in-group. The in-group subjugates other elements of their identity to establish and maintain
unity.
The question then is when does religion preempt other sources of group identity.
Consistent with the Symbolic Politics approach, the decisive factor is whether religion forms the
basis for establishing who is part of the “in-group” versus who is part of the “out-group.”
Specifically historical experience serves as the core a group’s political mythology to define itself.
As the case of the Gorani will show, religion played a less than significant role in terms of
defining ethnic identity. The fear rooted in historical event of Albanian discrimination of the
Gorani provided the unifying core of Gorani ethnic identity.
The theoretical approaches discussed thus far provide a framework to understand the
roots of the Gorani response to the Kosovo-Albanians and Kosovo-Serbs during the Kosovo
War. While the Instrumentalists, hard-rationalists and soft-rationalists provide reasons, their
reasons do not consistently suffice to explain the progression of ethnic mobilization to ethnic
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violence. The desire for economic benefit or other types of utilitarian gain do not suffice. In the
cases of the Baltic states, Estonian, Latvian and Lithuanian minorities enjoyed a comparatively
high standard of living. Each, however, found their unifying element in the emotional: the
desire not to be dominated.
In contrast, Sageman’s argument that ethnic violence has its roots in cases of political
mobilization where “in-group” members consider peaceful protest or the political process itself
insufficient to address group fears bears close resemblance to the Symbolic Politics adherents’
approach that ethnic violence results when recent events evoke historically based fears,
embodied in political myths, of ethnic extinction. In both arguments, such historical based fear
plays a significant role in inciting unity against the perceived oppressor “out-group.”
Constructivists too turn to myths to explain group identity. Ethnic violence, like ethnic
mobilization and ethnic identity, has its roots in preventing a “out-group,” which has proven
through myths to be oppressive in the past, to be oppressive in the current situation. And, it is in
the framework of Symbolic Politics where the phenomena of Gorani ethnic mobilization and
reaction during the Kosovo War is best understood.
2. The Gorani and Political Symbols
2.1 General History of the Region
To understand the Gorani, it is first necessary to understand the history of the region. The
Gorani traditionally occupied the Gora Region, which today falls both within the current
territories of Albania, Macedonia, and Kosovo. 119 However, the current borders are quite new.
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The history of the Gora Region and its peoples is also the history of empires who have fought
over the Balkans. As the Great Powers wrestled with each other for power, they shifted the
political borders irrespective of the identities of the peoples within the region.
The Gora Region, including seven Gorani villages in the region, was mentioned for the
first time in an edict of Serbian Emperor Stephan Dusan in 1348.120 During the 6th and 7th
centuries, there was an increase in the Slav population due to the Slavic immigration into the
Gora region. Soon afterwards, the region had to face with the Bulgar invasion and the Bulgars
also had settled in the Gora region.121
The Ottoman Empire began to conquer the Balkan region following the Battle of Kosovo,
1389. Following the Battle of Kosovo, Ottoman influence expanded across the region and
political administration of the Gora region changed with Ottoman Fatih Sultan Mehmed’s
conquest of Prizren in 1455.122 Thereafter, the Gora region was under the administration of
Sandjak Prizren,123 and this remained so until 1877, when Ottoman hegemons realigned the
region under the Vilayet-i Kosova, a newly established administrative district comprising most
of what would later become Kosovo. 124 As the Ottoman Empire expanded over the Balkan
region, collaterally, there was an increase in the Muslim population in the region.
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Under pressure from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, Imperial Russia and other Great
Powers’ search for empire in the Middle East, Ottoman dominance over the Balkan region, in
general, waned throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, entering the first stages of its final decline
with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars. During the 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian Empire
become an important power in the region. Due to the change of balance of power in the region,
the Treaty of Berlin was signed in 1878. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania gained their
independence with the Treaty of Berlin. In the early 20th century, the Ottoman Empire began to
shrink in the region. The influence of nationalism triggered the first Balkan War in 1912.
The Muslim Gorani fought against the Serbian army which occupied their territory
during the first Balkan War in 1912.125 The alliance which consist of Serbia, Bulgaria and
Greece, drove out the Ottomans from the region. Shortly thereafter, in accordance with the
Treaty of London in 1913, Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania declared their independence.
After the war, there was a big argument over who would rule the land. On one side was
Austro-Hungary and Italy, and on the other side was Russia. After all issues between the powers,
the Gora region ended up divided between Serbia and Albania, and this division meant that the
settlement of the Gorani people cut through with a border for the first time, but still there was not
an exact border line.126 After the Balkan wars, the separation of Gorani villages by the great
powers resulted in the largest Gorani Diaspora that ever occurred in Belgrade. 127 Estimated were
6,000 to 8,000 Gorani people, and there are some living Gorani population in Skopje and
Europe, mainly in Italy and Austria.128
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After World War I, the Austria-Hungarian Empire was defeated by the Allied Powers,
and the Peace Treaty of Versailles signed. It created new political state borders in the Balkan
region. Hence, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes established. The withdrawal of the
Ottoman Empire from the Balkans and the rise of many nation-states led to much immigration
occurring. Therefore, many minorities had to live under the sovereignty of different ethnic
groups. In 1929, King Alexander I changed the kingdom’s name from the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes into Yugoslavia, which created the anti-Serb movement.
When World War II occurred, another turmoil happened: Serbia was occupied by the
Germans. While the Serbs were fighting back with the Germans, Albanian and Italian troops
were occupied in the Kosovo. Meanwhile, the Bulgarians invaded Macedonia. In the year 1945,
under the tutelage of Josef Tito, Yugoslavia became a federation consisting of six equal
republics: Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In accordance with
the administration of the federation, Kosovo, like Vojvodina, gained an autonomous status
within the Republic of Serbia.
Over the course of the following thirty five years, Kosovo and the Gora Region
existed with greater Serbia within the Yugoslav Federation. Regional economic development
followed along the lines of a modified version of central planning, which Tito had developed.
Regional development across Yugoslavia varied within the constituent republics. Slovenia
became the most prosperous republic, followed by Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kosovo,
however, did not fare as well. Within Serbia, Kosovo lagged in terms of economic development.
Regional leaders in Kosovo faulted the unwillingness of central planners in Belgrade to provide
meaningful development projects for the region. Meanwhile, central planners blamed regional
leaders for squandering the resources which they had.
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With the death of Tito in 1980, the government of Yugoslavia began decentralizing
authorities, both political and economic. Instead of a single individual serving as president, the
six republics formed a joint presidency with each republic sending a regional leader to represent
their republic’s views at the federation level. The Yugoslav government likewise decentralized
economic direction to give each of the republics more autonomy over their own regional
development.
Throughout the 1980’s, as power devolved from the federal level to the local
government, ethnic tensions again arose. In response to local demands for more autonomy,
leaders in Kosovo demanded for more autonomy. In response, in 1990, rather than increasing it,
Slobodan Milosevic passed laws returning Kosovo’s status back to its status in 1971.129
Milosevic’s changes did not have the desired effect. Rather, in response to the changes, KosovoAlbanians protested across Kosovo. Ibrahim Rugova, who later became the first president of
Kosovo, opposed Milosevic nullifying Kosovo’s autonomy. Rugova sought change through
peaceful resistance. Rugova was eventually replaced by Adem Jashari, who viewed violence as
the only means to liberate Kosovo from Serb rule. Under the leadership of Jashari, the fire of
independence gradually grew and in 1998, the Kosovo Liberation Army, consisting of ethnic
Albanians from Kosovo, hereinafter referred Kosovo-Albanians, rebelled against the Serbs.
2.2 The Gora Region
The formal borders of the Gora Region, gora meaning “mountainous” in Serbo-Croatian,
are historically very fluid. And, as Thomas Schmidinger mentions in his book, there are not
comprehensive, scientific and historical sources about the history of the Gora Region in German,
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English, Albanian, Serbian or Macedonian.130 What histories exist are subsumed in the context of
shifts in the balance of powers and resulting shifts in the political borders.
The Gora Region131 describes a unique and mountainous area in the southwest of
Metohija in the region Serbians understand as Kosovo-Metohija, commonly referred to as
modern day Kosovo. The Gora region is an area of mountains, mainly the Sharri (Šar)
Mountains. Xerxa’s Mountain is in the west part of the region; the Kornitik Mountain is in the
west and north-west; the Kacina Glava is in the northern part of the region; the Gemitas
Mountain is in the eastern side of it, the Kallabak Mountain is in the southern part; Gjallica
Mountains are located in the south-west.132 However, the northern part of the Gora region, also
known as Opolje region, is less elevated in comparison to the southern part of the region. 133
The Gora Region is a mainly rural area due to its geographic mountainous conditions.
Due to its geography and natural resource endowments, the region is not well urbanized. Its
inhabitants live in close-knit villages, which cluster in close proximity to one another.134 The
villages are generally located near rivers and foothills.135 The Gora region is 65-70% meadows
and mountain ranges. Due to the natural terrain, the Gorani people derived their livelihood from
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animal husbandry.136 For example, one of the well-known products from the Gora Region is Šar
cheese.137
Gorani people had other occupations besides animal husbandry. This lifestyle of Gorani
people, which was kept for centuries, affected their collective identity. 138 For instance, during the
Ottoman Empire, they were doing business in bakeries and restaurants, and as sellers of dried
nuts and fruits within the Ottoman Empire territory, mainly in Anatolia.139 The region could not
be industrialized because of wars and other factors. Thus, the region was one of the poorest areas
within Yugoslavia. Even today, the Dragash municipality is the poorest in Kosovo.140
The Gora Region was an area in which many ancient trade roads intersected in the preOttoman times.141 In the 20th century, the Brod (Slavic ford) formed, which is currently a small
village near the Macedonian border, but also here were old trade roads at the end of steep
canyons, and it represents the actual cultural and economic center of the region.142 However, the
region couldn’t be developed, due to the geographical factors mentioned earlier.
The main settlement of the Gorani people was the town of Dragash up until the 1960s. 143
The city of Dragash as a Gorani settlement changed when the Gorani population mixed with the
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Albanian population in the1970s.144 Despite all that, between 1991 and 1999, the Gorani people
finally established an independent municipality called Gora, which coincided exactly with the
time of the Serbian ruling in Kosovo. 145 The Serbs conducted policies that tried to favor the nonAlbanian minorities, and correspondingly, the Gorani were seen as a friendly community by the
Serbs.146 Therefore, the Serbs were treating the Gorani with particular attention and privileges.147
On the other hand, Albanians have historically tried to delegitimize the Gora municipality
as Slavic territory. Kosovo-Albanians claimed the Gora Region as “Albanian soil.” And, they
viewed the Gora municipality as a Serb instrument of rule.148
Currently, the Gora Region falls between three countries, the first being Albania, which
received a portion of the Gora Region following the Treaty of London. 149 In Albania, Gorani live
in a total of nine to ten villages in the border region adjacent to the Gorani settlement area in
Kosovo, which include the Gorani villages of Zapot (Albanian Zapod), Pakišta (alb. Pakisht),
Očikle (alb. Orçikël), Košarište, Orgosta (orgjost), Crnolevo (alb. Cernalevë), Orešek (alb.
Orshekë), Borje (alb. Borje) and Šištevec (alb. Shistavec).150 The second country which claims
part of the Gora Region is present-day Macedonia, where the villages of Urviqi and Jelovljaniare
are located. 151 The remaining Gorani villages of Baçkë, Brod, Dikanci, Dragash (the former
name Krakojshte), Glloboçicë, Kukolan, Lubovishtë, Mlike, Orçushë, Radesh, Rapçë, Restelicë,
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Vranishte and Zlipotok, fall within Kosovo, the youngest state in Europe and Balkan region. 152
In total, Kosovo consists of seven districts.153
The former Municipality of Gora now falls between two of those administrative districts,
i.e. the Municipality of Dragash, which remains largely Gorani occupied and includes the Gora
and Dragash districts, and the Municipality of Prizren, a largely ethnic Albanian district to which
the Kosovo-Albanians annexed the Opolje district in 1999, when the Kosovo-Albanians
dominated the Municipality of Gora. 154 In order to see the municipalities on Kosovo map, see
Appendix B, figure 6 and 7.
According to Mike Harrison, a former UNMIK official, the division of the districts into
Gora, Opolje and Dragash has special significance for the Gorani. It is a political division and
does not correspond to the geographic or historic region that was Gora.155 The gradual loss of the
Gora Region, mostly to ethnic Albanians, is a source of rivalry between the Gorani and ethnic
Albanians. But, more importantly, it is a factor unifying the Gorani as an ethnic group.
2.3 The Gorani People
The origin of the Gorani people, like the history of their territory, is in dispute and is clouded
by the Albanian, Bulgarian, Macedonian and Serbian historians who, in order to justify political
outcomes, seek to categorize the Gorani as merely descendants of their own historical lineages
and to justify the Gora Region as traditionally part of their territory, or at least, to show the Gora
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Region did not ever belong to other regional rivals. This contest over history of the Gorani in that
sense confirms the rivalry of these outside powers. It also serves as the keystone along which the
Gorani identify their ethnic identity.
Confusion about the origins of the Gorani also comes from the topographers and censustakers themselves, who while perhaps motivated by government policies or simply out of lack of
understanding of the Gorani as a people. Census-takers often categorized the Gorani as either
Bosniaks, Bulgarian Muslims or Macedonian Muslims or even Serbians largely because the
Gorani, whose relative population size was always small, fit easier into categories of the larger
minorities in the region. Similarly, topographers seeking to identify religious or ethnic
distributions in the region, simply depicted the Gorani under the moniker of the largest groups in
the region. Hence, Ottoman maps of the region depict the Gorani as Muslims; Russians maps as
Albanians, and Serbian maps as Bosniaks.
In terms of historical research, scholars use mainly written sources and those are generally
chronicles, archives or the notes of travelers who visited that region. Since the Gorani people are
mostly peasants and living far from urban areas, the Gorani people themselves did not develop a
clear and definitive written history. A Gorani intellectual elite also did not arise to consolidate
the literature or its traditions. What history there is exists largely as oral history. 156 And, in terms
of notes of travelers, the Gorani people were not a subject of the travelers of that region due to
the small size of the group.157
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However, the Gorani have a unique identity. The name Gorani or Goranci-Goranski means
inhabitants of mountains, and they also call themselves ‘Nashinski’, which means our people.158
Not much research has been conducted about the Gorani people due to some factors. Mainly,
research about Gorani and their origins are conducted by a small group of scholars who study
them and a small group of Gorani themselves as well.159
Insofar as circumstances permit, the assumptions about the origin of the Gorani people
are still complex because the theories of the origin of the group are mostly under the influence of
political opportunists. However, Schmidinger writes an important argument that a certificate was
issued by the Syrian Ministry of Education on 10 October 1995 that claimed that some people
from Aleppo had immigrated to the Gora region between 1095 to 1291.160 As evidence, he points
that there is a mosque named the mosque of Mlike, in the place where they had immigrated, and
the neighborhood where the mosque is located is still called Halepovci. Through this perspective,
it might be the case that the Gora region met with Islam before the Ottoman Empire’s conquest
of the region.161
It should be highlighted that nationalism influenced multiethnic states from which many
nation-states arose in the Balkan region. Nevertheless, though ethnic and national identities
became primary identities in most of the Balkans, the religious dimension remained strong.
Religious identification has been made subordinate to ethnic identification, and religious rivalry
transformed into the ethnic and national antagonism.” 162 One example of it is in Kosovo, where
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the conflict between ethnic Serbs and Kosovo Albanians took on the appearance of a conflict
between Muslims and Christians.
In terms of identification of Gorani in the face of differing historical claims, Yugoslav
officials classified the Gorani in the category of “non-Slavs,” the reason most probably being
their religion.163 In the1980s, while the Macedonian press was claiming that the Gorani are
actually Macedonian (Torbeši- Macedonian Muslims), the Gorani people defined themselves as
ethnic Muslims just like their brethren in Bosnia. 164
The various arguments create some doubt as to when the Gorani became Muslim.
However, the common theme in all these arguments is the Gorani are Sunni Muslims, who speak
a Slavic language akin to Macedonian and Bulgarian. They have inhabited the Gora region for
several centuries. In sum, religion is one of the necessary factors to identify the Gorani as an
ethnic group for both the Gorani and other outside observers. On the other hand, pro-Serb and
Serbian historians see the Gorani as Serbs who converted to Islam during the era of the Ottoman
Empire in the region. In contrast, Albanian historians accept them as Slav-Albanians, or Balkan
people.165 Another complication in the Serb-Albanian conflict over Kosovo is that according to
the Serb writer, Gora and Opolje regions are entirely Slavic Muslim people and the people have
Serb origins.166 In contrast, the Albanian perspective is that the Opolje region was the home of
the Albanian population, just like today, and the Gorani were Slavic-speaking people but they
were not Serbs.167 On the other hand, Harun Hasani writes that according to the first written
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document (1348) which is an Old-Church Slavonic document, Brod was mentioned as this
(Gorani) people’s settlements.168 Another perspective on the origins of the Gorani, held by
Bulgarian and Macedonian historians, is that the Gorani are Islamized Bulgarians and
Macedonians.169 In addition to all that, there is one more claim that seeks to connect the origin of
the Gorani to the Turkic people.170 According to Harrison,
“Some researchers claim that Gorani are Muslim Macedonians. These facts
(include this: they were Orthodox Christians and became Muslim) are often
denied by some Gorani people for political and religious reasons. After 1999,
some Gorani, in order to get distant from Serbs, have come up with new theories
on their origin. Some Gorani believe that they are descendants from Bulgarians,
members of the heretic Orthodox sect of “Bogomil,” who were prosecuted and
forced to migrate to southern Balkans. Others say the Gorani are ethnically linked
to the Bosniaks. However, there seem to be enough scientific and historic
evidences proving their close ethnic relationship with Macedonians as well as
their Christian-Orthodox past.” 171
In terms of the origin of the Gorani people, there are various claims as described in the previous
paragraph. The main reasons for the complexity of “Gorani” identity were, firstly, that the group
adapted the identity of the ruler state of the region, and secondly, that the identification was tried
drawn by different state policies and political elites as mentioned previously. 172 According to the
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Hasani, “they are holding a separate ethnic group identity based on anthropological, anthropogeographical, ethno-social, philological, folklore and other characteristics Goranies represent,
even though they are Serbo-Slavic population.”173 Thomas Schmidinger outlines the claims of
the origins of Gorani.174
Broadly, the Albanian and Kosovar Albanian thesis claims Illyrians lived in the region
historically. Therefore, all Albanians are descendants of Illyrians. Thus, the inhabitants of the
region grounds to the Illyrians. Therefore, the region had been inhabited by the Illyrians and then
by Albanians since ancient times. Albanian historian Muharrem Qafleshi, tries to prove his
argument with the customs of Illyrians among Albanians and Gorani. 175 According to the theory,
the existence of the Slavic people in the region is based on late Slavicization by a relatively small
a group of Slav immigrants. Opposite to the Albanian thesis, the Serbian perspective is that the
region was the old-Serbian settlements and propagated with Islamization of originally Serb
Gorani- Goranci in Serbian. However, Serb authors did not unify about when the Islamization
occurred over the Gorani people. Schmidinger writes an interesting point that there are also some
pro-Serb Gorani authors who defends the thesis.
Those two main arguments are rival arguments. There are some more arguments about
the origins of the Gorani people. The first of the arguments is driven by a language researcher
Ramadan Redžeplari, who is from Zlipotok, the Gora region. He tries to establish a link between
the Gorani and the Turks. The first of Redžeplari’s claims that early Islamization of the region.
The second is that the ancestor of Gorani came to the region with immigration of Turkish-
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Mongolian tribes, which occurred 2,500 years ago from Central Asia to Balkans. The third claim
is the Gorani term was not derived from Slavic word ‘Berg’ but the Central Asian breed of
goral.176 The Gorani people brought the name through the Black Sea to the Gora with the
migration from Central Asia.177
Thomas Schmidinger writes another argument about the origins of the Gorani people that
Nazif Dokle also supports. Nazif Dokle is one of the important Gorani intellectuals about the
language and Gorani history from Albania.178 According to the Dokle, the Gorani are
descendants of Slavic speaking Bogomil, which was a Christian sect, and were spreading
Christianity in South-East Europe and Anatolia around the10th to 15th centuries. Dokle
establishes his theory based on the linguistic similarities between Torbeš, which is the term for
Macedonian-speaking Muslims, and the term of ‘beggars,’ and claims similarities to the
Bogumilic symbols from the Goran villages of Borje and Šištevec in Albania. Muharrem
Qafleshi cites Dokle’s work and writes that Dokle the Gorani had a unique national
consciousness.179 “Gorani do not call themselves Serbs, Bulgarians, Macedonians, Turks or
Albanians but only Gorani and Bosniaks.” 180
Regarding the Bosniak identity of the Gorani people, Schmidinger points out that small
minority groups have been forced to create political and economic connections by assigning
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them to a larger ethnic group in order to keep their existence.181 In that sense, after the Serb
withdrawal from Kosovo, meaning the ability of the Serb government to protect the Gorani
people, the Gorani, largely for census purposes, identified themselves a “Bosniaks.” 182
Duijzings summarizes the situation of the Gorani in Kosovo best. He writes:
“During Ottoman Empire and thereafter, where group boundaries tended to be
fluid and less institutionalized, and where identities weakly defined or ambiguous
identity, ethnic identity becomes a bone of contention between more powerful
groups. (…) This is the case is exemplified by the existence of ethnic and
religious anomalies; small ethnic and religious minorities do not fit into the neat
system of the dominant Serbian-Albanian opposition, for example the Croats,
Turks, Gypsies, Circassians and Slavic Muslims (Goranci), as well as the Catholic
Albanians, the Turkophone Albanians (particularly in Prizren) and the
Slavophone Albanians (in Rahvec). Their identity can be considered as ‘neithernor’ or ‘both-and.’ They are ‘betwixt and between’ and tend to mess up any neat
system of contrast in ethnic classification.” 183
Thus, most of these discussions about the origins of Gorani to-date aim to merge Gorani identity
with the other powerful ethnic identities in the region.
External events also impacted the Gorani in forming their ethnic identity and group unity.
The Balkan Wars and a subsequent famine, during which many Gorani lost their lives due to
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hunger and disease, led the Gorani to migrate from the Gora Region to escape poverty.
Specifically, many Gorani fled to local urban areas in the region, where jobs and food were more
plentiful.184 The Gorani, who remained the Gora Region, lost their lives due to hunger and
diseases. Others perished on their trek to Prizren and Tetovo, which became havens for the
Gorani refugees.185 And, after World War II, there was another immigration movement for the
Gorani people. They had to leave their houses “because of new socio-economic relations,
political circumstances, introduction of collectivization and buying up of crops in their
villages.”186 Their land and properties were desolated and sold at very cheap prices, and groups
fled to the nearest towns: Prizren, Pristina, Tetovo, Skopje, and Belgrade; the other group who
immigrated went to Turkey. 187
The Gorani, whose ethnicity was not listed as one of the larger minorities on official
documents, classified themselves as the ethnic group with which they resembled the most. Hence
when they immigrated, they mostly introduced themselves as Bosniaks or did not specify their
ethnic backgrounds.188 Today, in addition to the cities named above, the Gorani reside in the
cities of Prizren, Mitrovica and Pec, and in Skopje along with three Gorani Villages in the
territory of Macedonia and other nine settlements in Albania.”189
The origins of the Gorani is a question for further research. Their origins have become
shrouded first by the desire of larger ethnic groups to assimilate them and second by censustakers, other government officials and the Gorani themselves who categorized the Gorani as
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members of the similar larger ethnic groups. All recognized they were Muslims who spoke a
Slavic language and coming from the Gora Region. But only the Gorani recognized the
uniqueness of their language, their customs, their religion and homeland as unique from their
fellow Muslim and Slavic neighbors.
2.4 Religion of Gorani
The Gorani, as people, are Sunni Muslims, whose interpretation of Islam also includes
traditions associated with the Bogumils, a Bulgarian Orthodox sect which spread their faith
across Southeast Europe between 900 and 1400 AD.190 Founded by the priest, Bogumil, the
Bogumils favored a more spiritual, less hierarchical, approach to understanding the Orthodox
faith. The Bogomil influence lingers to this day and differentiates the Gorani from other Sunni
Muslims. While fundamentally Muslims, the Gorani still recognize Bogumil, observe a number
of Bogumil traditions and celebrate certain holy days honoring Bogumil saints.
How the Gorani came to be Muslims is also in debate. According to most accounts, the
Gorani met Islam with the conquest of the Balkans by the Ottoman Empire. As the Ottoman
Empire expanded over the Balkan region, there was a simultaneously increase in the Muslim
population in the region. The proselytization of the Gorani people occurred in 1766.191
According to Malcolm, legend maintains the main reason for the Gorani, who were originally
Christian Orthodox, accepting Islam was “the neglect or hostility shown to the Gorani by Greek
Bishops after the closure of the Serbian Patriarchate.”192
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The second reason the Gorani people converted to Islam was the millet system, which the
Ottomans used to categorize peoples in the Ottoman-occupied territories.193 According to the
millet system, the Ottoman precepts defined “the politically relevant identities” based in terms of
their religion.194 Hence, Ottoman censuses classified the inhabitants of regions based on whether
they were “people of the Book,” e.g. as “Christian,” “Muslim,” “Jews,” all of which are
historically descendants of Abraham, and “Others.” Basically, the peoples living in the
Ottoman’s multiethnic, multi-religious society were classified according to their religions and
sects.195
However, the meaning of “millet,” a Turkish term, has two senses. As used during the
period of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, it primarily referred to one’s religious or a sectarian
affiliation, but could also connote ethnicity. 196 Around the end of the 19th century, millet began to
refer primarily to ethnicity; religion became an identified of ethnicity.197
But, more than merely being a basis to classify and count who lived in their territories,
the millet lists also served as the basis upon which to levy and collect taxes. Those who
converted to Islam paid lower taxes and received other economic advantages. Economic factors
led to many minorities to become Muslim. Many ethnic groups living the Ottoman dominated
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areas therefore accepted Islam, and, in doing so, became part of the ruling class regardless of
their ethnic background or language.198
There is yet a third argument as to when the Gorani became Muslims, an explanation
which predates the Ottoman conquest. According to Schmidinger the Syrian Ministry of
Education issued a certificate claiming that some Muslims from Aleppo had emigrated to the
Gora Region between 1095 to 1291, a period the Serbian Despotate’s conquest of the Gora
Region in 1455.199 As possible evidence to substantiate this cliam, Schmidinger points to the
ancient Mosque of Mlike in the village of Halepovci, a derivative of the Arabic name for Allepo.
Through this perspective, it might be the case that the Gora region met with Islam before the
Ottoman Empire’s conquest of the region.
Clearly, by the late 1700’s, the Gorani were practicing Muslims. The singular identity of
their religion got diluted in later years, again due to political pressures and perhaps largely out of
bureaucratic laziness. As the Ottoman millet system hid the Gorani’s Slavic roots, the Yugoslav
census takers obfuscated the Gorani’s approach to Islam from with other Yugoslav Muslims.
While some Yugoslav records indicate that Yugoslav officials classified the Gorani in the
category of “non-Slavs,” due to their religion,200 the general trend was to place the Gorani into a
larger basket of Slavic Muslims.
According to Yugoslav records, the Muslim community officially consisted of four main
groups: Bosniaks, Albanian Muslims, Turkish Muslims, and Slavic Macedonian Muslims,201
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who resided largely in Bosnia as well as the Sandzak, Kosovo, Metohia, and Kumanovo regions
of Yugoslavia.202 Due partially to similar linguistic roots of Gorani and Serbo-Croatian; and due
partially to the Gorani and Bosniaks living in close proximity to one another in the Gora Region,
the Gorani identity fell under the category of “Bosniak.”
A Tito era decision however blurred the Gorani identity even further. Initially, Muslims
had to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats. Later, they could declare themselves as
“nationally non-aligned Muslims.” 203 But, in January 1968, as part of an effort to recognize the
uniqueness of the Bosniak ethnicity in Bosnia-Herzegovina and in a step toward decentralization
of power, the Yugoslav government officially recognized the Bosniaks in Bosnia-Herzegovina as
a separate ethnic group and afforded the status of a full nationality. 204 This status covered the
Muslims living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Croatia and Serbia (but not in Kosovo)
only.205
In Kosovo, Albanian-speaking Muslims were categorized Albanian and in Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Macedonian-speaking Muslims were categorized as Macedonian.206
Due to the close affinity of the Gorani language to Macedonian, the Gorani could have been
classified as Macedonian Muslims. And, as recent as the 1980s, the Macedonian press was
claiming the Gorani were Torbeši- Macedonian Muslims.207
However, by the 1980’s, the Gorani sought to differentiate themselves from other Slavic
Muslims. First, they refuted the Macedonian claims they were Torbeši. And second, they
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distanced themselves from the Bosniaks. Instead, the Gorani people defined themselves as a
separate ethnic Slavic Muslim group distinct but like their Bosniak brethren in BosniaHerzegovina.208
The Gorani also differentiate their approach to Islam as distinct from other local
Muslims. According to the Gorani, the ethnic Albanian and other Balkan Muslim groups fell
under the influence of the Bektashi, 209. The Bektashi order, which was founded by Balim Sultan,
is a spiritualistic Sufi Muslim ascetic order. The Bektashism has many similarities with other
Islamic mystical groups through spiritual path. The Gorani derive their spiritualism as well as
many other traditions from their Bogumil tradition.
2.5 The Language of Gorani
Language is a significant factor in many aspects. Language is the basis for social
relations as well as national identity. It provides a basis to trace the historic origins of a people
and their thought system as a nation. Language provides the optic through which a people
understand the world around them. But most importantly, language is a defining element in
determining national consciousness, separating one group from another.
In the case of the Gorani language, according to Schmidinger, the Gorani name the
language they speak as Nashinski, which means “our language,” but often referred to by others
as Goranski”210 Nashinski belongs broadly to the South Slavic language family which includes
Slovenian, Bulgarian, Macedonian, Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian and Montenegrin. More
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narrowly, it bears close relation to Macedonian and Serbian.211 More specifically, however,
Goranian scholars associate their language, however, closer to the Bulgarian spoken in northwest
Macedonia.212 And, due largely to the history, geographic proximity and the consequent
interaction of peoples, Nashinski also has numerous loan words and cognates from Turkish,
Arabic and Albanian. 213
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the former Gora Region is currently divided in two
parts, Opolje and Gora. The main language in Opolje is Albanian where the Kosovo-Albanians
dominate and have displaced the ethnic Gorani. The language currently spoken in Gora, where
Gorani outnumber other minorities, is Nashinski. But, because of the sizable Bosniak community
in the Gora, many residents also speak Bosnian.214
As with claims for dominance over their territory, other ethnic minorities, ethnic
Albanians in particular, have sought to have their language dominate or subsume Nashinski as
they moved into the region and gained political sway. This was especially the case following the
Balkan Wars but mostly during the period when Kosovo-Albanians called for Kosovo’s
independence. As they moved to annex territory from the Gorani, ethnic Albanians have
attempted to make Albanian the language of business, governance and education in the areas
where they have political dominance. And, in 1946, the Kosovo-Albanians forced many Gorani
to adopt Albanian names.215 Kosovo, which has traditionally had a large ethnic Albanian
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population, also designated Albanian as the primary language of social and business interactions.
The Gorani have largely resisted such attempts by speaking Nashinski at home and advocating
for learning Serbian in school. Kosovo-Albanian efforts to minimize the importance of Nashinski
extend further insofar as they are putting pressure on the Gorani to abandon both Serb-Croatian
and Nashinski as the language of education. Harrison stated that the language of education has
traditionally been in Serbo-Croatian for decades,216 but as the Kosovo-Albanians come asserted
their independence from Serbia, language policies which complemented their political objectives
followed suit. Wanting to reduce the influence of Serbia in Kosovo, the Government of Kosovo
has pushed to make the languages of instruction Albanian and Bosnian, the latter replacing
Serbo-Croatian. And despite their previous affiliation with the Bosniaks, the Gorani are now
even seeking to clearly distance themselves from the Bosniaks. As Harrison highlights
“it (Gorani language of education) became controversial and politicized after
1999, when Kosovo-Albanians and Bosniaks started to press the Gorani to switch
(their primary language of instruction) to Bosnian. The Bosniaks claim that
Gorani teachers are being paid by Belgrade to keep the students engaged in (Serb)
parallel structures in order to avoid integrating into the Kosovo institutions. On
the other hand, the Gorani teachers and parents claim that Bosnian language is not
traditional among Gorani, and they want education in Serbia-Croatian for
practical reasons, as the students often follow the higher education in Serbia.”217
The debate over language education in Gora is thus divided into two groups: the Gorani and the
Bosniaks. The Gorani want education to be in Serbian instead of Bosnian because they want to
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preserve their identity from real and potential assimilation efforts pushed by their counterparts in
the Bosniak community.218
On the opposite side of the debate are the Bosniaks who do not accept the Gorani people
as a separate ethnic group. They view the group “as integral members of the Bosniak ‘corpus’
who have not yet fully developed their “national consciousness.”219 From the Bosniak point of
view, the Gorani, who want to be educated in Serbian, are “betraying their collective identity
with their Bosniak brethren.”220
This controversial situation manifests itself in the Kosovo Education Strategic Plan of
2017-2021. Although, the plan does not address the Gorani community directly, it mentions the
Serb community as an umbrella term for the Kosovo-Serbs and the other groups who receive
their education in Serbian.221 The author writes that some schools continue to teach in Serbian
thus remaining outside of the Kosovo education system.222 The plan describes the students who
get education from the schools teaching in Serbian as not fully integrated into the Kosovo
education system.223
The reasons extend beyond language of instruction but reinforce Gorani opposition to
adopting Albanian or Bosnian. According to Harrison, many Gorani parents oppose the new
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Kosovo government’s nine-grade education system224 because it is not compatible with the 8grade education system used in Serbia. The incompatibility of the Serbian and Kosovo education
systems affects Gorani students who want to continue their higher education in Serbia. Gorani
students must study one more year, a “9th grade,” in order to graduate from primary school in
Kosovo. Therefore, many Gorani students, who complete 8th grade, decide not to go to 9th grade,
and instead, stay at home.225
Even though the Gorani make up a small group, they have been able to maintain their
customs and cultures. The Gorani have used their approach to the education policy as a means to
resist the Bosniaks and Kosovo-Albanians, who, unlike the Serbs, live in close proximity in the
Gora Region and represent the most pressing threats to the Gorani lands. Even though the Gorani
and the Bosniaks share a similar language and, in general as mentioned, a common religion, the
Gorani still differentiate themselves from the Bosniaks as they speak Nashinski and the Bosniaks
Bosnian.
But the small size of the Gorani population in the larger Kosovo likely precludes the
Gorani from requesting a separate Nashinski-based education system. In order to oppose larger
threats to their identity, e.g. Kosovo-Albanian dominance and Bosniak assimilation, and still
maintain their future viability, the Gorani have acquiesced on the language of education. The
Gorani are, consistent with their historical fears, acquiescent on the language issue. While it does
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not bode well for the future of Nashinski insofar as the Gorani are willing to speak Nashinski
only in the home and amongst their own kind, by accepting the education of their children in
Serbian, the Gorani ward off Bosniak and Albanian assimilation. The Serbs do not represent a
substantive threat to the Gorani identity. And, to date, the Gorani elite have not yet asserted
themselves in pushing a separate Gorani-mobilized political identity.
In sum, the Gorani have so far been able to protect their native language in spite of many
outside attempts to influence them. Important to the preservation of their language is geography.
As discussed earlier, the Gora region is mountainous and compact. Because of this, the Gorani
people kept themselves relatively isolated and accepted Islam without losing their own
language.226 The use of Nashinski is a defining element of the Gorani, differentiating them from
the Albanians and Bosniaks and uniting them with Serbs, who have not threatened them.
2.6 Gorani Identity and Albanian Chauvinism from the Balkan Wars to the Kosovo War
According to the Kaufman’s Symbolic Politics theory, the creation of symbolic elements
for the Gorani culture resulted in the creation of various symbolic factors within the culture.
Despite all those being under construction by various powers, the Gorani people were able to
create and maintain their own group identity. The three traits which define Gorani identity, their
political symbols so to speak, are thus defense of their language, defense of their religion, and
defense of their territory from outside aggression.
Relations between Gorani and Albanians have been historically tense. An indicator of the
tension is the dearth of intermarriages. Albanians and Gorani living in rural areas seldom
married. Only in Prizren did families of Albanians and Gorani intermarry. 227 Therefore, the
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separation in both group, in their villages and lifestyles, was distinctly visible in the region.228
Through this division, it may be understood that the Gorani did not see themselves as part of
their fellow Muslims in Kosovo, e.g. the Kosovo Albanians.
The most pressing threat to the Gorani’s existence as an ethnic group is that posed by
Albanians, be it those in Albania or Kosovo-Albanians. And, Albanian nationalism is an
important element to understand in the Gorani situation during the Kosovo War (1998-1999).
Linked to Albanian nationalism is the ethnic Albanian efforts to take land within the Gora
Region.
Albanian nationalism occurred later than Serbian nationalism.229 In the early 19th century,
the Greeks gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire and, in 1815, the Serbs gained
greater autonomy but not independence, remaining part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Serb
nationalism and the desire for an independent state was the spark which ignited World War I.
Only after the end of World War I did the Serbs receive a degree of independence with the newly
created Yugoslavia, one in which the Serb exercised a degree of political dominance over the
other ethnic groups.
However, the Albanians did not develop nationalist sentiments until later. 230 Present day
Albania remained part of the Ottoman Empire. Further, Albanians, many of whom were Muslim
and hence occupied prominent regional positions within the Ottoman Empire, maintained their
allegiance to the Ottomans much longer than the Serbs and Greeks. 231 Albanian nationalist
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yearnings came later following the Balkan Wars when the Treaty of London (1912) established
Albania as an independent nation-state.
Nationalism is relatively recent term. But, as Duijzings mentions in his book, even
though nationalism is a modern concept, “it has often resorted to pre-modern values and
symbols, borrowed in particular from kinship and religion.”232 For example, in the process of the
construction of Serbian and Albanian national identities, intellectuals and ideologists used
religious elements in order to establish nationalism.233 The Greeks and the Serbs shared a
common Christian identity against the Ottoman Empire in their independence.234
However, although Serbian nationalism united ethnic and religious identities, Albanian
nationalism later lost its religious aspect. Unlike their Kosovo-Albanian brethren, the ethnic
Albanians in Albania professed to three religions. Although Albanian Muslims were the largest
subset of religious groups, there were also Catholic and Eastern Orthodox communities among
the ethnic Albanians in Albania. 235 All of these religious followers in Albania contributed to the
national development of Albanian nationalism around the 1900s.236 Radical Albanian leaders
thus underscored cultural and linguistic unity rather than religious unity as an element of
establishing Albanian identity. 237 “The Albanian language established commonality among the
Albanian peoples’ various religions and therefore played an important role in the Albanian
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nationalist movement. The Albanian language, in particular, gave Albanians the feelings of
belonging to the same nation.”238
Language was a main tool for Albanian nationalism because language was an explicit
element that differentiated the Albanians from their Slav neighbors. 239 Duijzings points out that,
even though 90 % of the Albanian population in Kosovo was Muslim, Islam did not have any
role for the political mobilization of Albanians.240 Furthermore, the Albanian Catholics were
prominent supporters of their Albanian Muslim fellows in the Albanian opposition against the
Serb hegemony.241
Albanian chauvinism, in the Albanian national awakening, thus included the dominance
of Albanian over Slavic languages. Albanian nationalism, which was established based on the
Albanian culture and language, was not tolerant for the other non-Albanian minorities, which
were expelled from Kosovo.242 As a Slavic speaking people, the Gorani represented an “outgroup” to the Albanians and seemed to the Albanians a natural ally of the Serbs due to their
common linguistic heritage. The fear of being unable to speak one’s own language may have led
them to take sides with the Serbs during the war.
Unlike their opposition to the Gorani, the Kosovo-Albanian opposition to the ethnic
Serbs was based on religion. The Kosovo-Albanians relegated religion in their approach to the
Gorani as they had done when unifying Albanians in creating an independent Albania. The
Gorani too, on their part, downplayed the role of religion in developing their collective identity
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against the Kosovo-Albanians. If the Gorani had placed more emphasis on religion, the Gorani
would have sided likely sided with the Kosovo-Albanians. With that in mind, language became
the defining elements of the clash of identities between the Kosovo-Albanians and their Gorani
religious kin.
An important source of tensions between the Gorani and the Kosovo Albanians is the
Gorani’s fear of losing territory.243 First, in 1912, with the creation of Albania, the Gorani lost
the western reaches of the Gora Region to Albania. Then as Yugoslavia dissolved following the
death of Tito, the Gorani again lost territory. 244
The Gorani, whom the Serbs treated benevolently, received protections against further
Albanian aggression.245 The Gorani settlements along the Albanian border were holding a
strategic importance for Belgrade. Therefore, following World War II, the Tito regime
established the Gora District within Kosovo. The Gora District consisted of four communities:
Dragash, Vranishte, Brod and Krushevo. Unlike other minorities, the Gorani were not ordered by
the Serbs to evacuate their villages during the conflict.246 And, between 1991 and 1999, in order
to bolster the non-Albanian minorities in the Gora Region and to delegitimize Albanian claims to
territory, the Serbs established the Nashinski-speaking autonomous Gora District, an act which
the Albanians perceived as a means of Serb dominance in the area.247
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Not surprisingly, Albanian efforts to increase their dominance over the Gorani increased.
Starting in the early 1960s, Kosovo-Albanians began to settle in Dragash, increasing the size of
their population in the city. And, between 1991 and 1999, the number of Albanians in Dragash
doubled and the Gora District divided de facto into the upper Dragash, where the Albanians
outnumbered the Gorani and the lower Dragash, where the native Gorani lived. The former
corresponded to the Opolje area. From the Gorani and Serb perspective, the Albanian
resettlement of Dragash came to represent an “Albanianization” of the region. 248
Another significant incident occurred in 1991; namely in 1991, the Yugoslav government
issued a regulation, which among other administrative changes in Kosovo, divided the
Municipality of Dragash into two separate municipalities: The Municipality of Gora, which
covered the region of the Gorani villages, and the Municipality of Opolje, which included the
Albanians villages. Although the Gorani accepted the decision, the Albanian side did not. Instead
the Albanians boycotted the decision and instead attached themselves to the Municipality of
Prizren, a predominantly Albanian district. 249
The outbreak of the Kosovo War in 1998 and 1999 marked a more aggressive phase of
Kosovo-Albanian attempts to dominate the Gorani. The Kosovo-Albanians directed their
political efforts as well as their military forces against both the ethnic Serbs and other ethnic
groups, which either did not side with them or whom they viewed as sympathetic to the Serbs.
The Gorani naturally fell into both categories.
The Kosovo War broke out in 1998 when Kosovo-Albanians, who were calling for
independence from Serbia, met resistance from the Serb government and the remnants of
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remaining Serb-dominated Yugoslav National Army (JNA). The Kosovo-Albanian military,
which came to be known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) or, in Albanian, the Ushtria
Çlirimtare e Kosovës-(UÇK), was primarily a paramilitary organization. The KLA gained both
notoriety and acclaim for its successful use of guerilla tactics against those who opposed them. In
response, the JNA intervened in Kosovo to defend from the KLA wrath both the territorial
integrity of Serbia, of which Kosovo was merely an autonomous region, and to defend the Serb
population and culture. Both the KLA and JNA committed what the international community
considered incidents of ethnic cleansing and other types of war crimes. In early 1999, in the
wake of the humanitarian crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO forces intervened to repel the
JNA and to quell the violence. In June 1999, after months of NATO bombing of Belgrade and
Serbian military sites, the United Nations (UN) approved United Nations Security Council
Resolution (UNSCR) 1244, which established UNMIK as the UN entity to oversee resolution of
the Kosovo crisis and also identified the NATO-led Kosovo Forces (KFOR) as the peacekeeping force to maintain order in the region. 250
After the UN adopted UNSCR 1244 concluding the war, many Serbs and other ethnic
minorities migrated. Some immigrated to Serbia; others simply migrated to areas where they felt
safe from either the JNA, the KLA or both. As might be expected, many Serbian administrative
systems collapsed, and only very limited Serb settlements were left because most fled. On the
other hand, many Kosovo-Albanians, who had sought refuge Albania, Macedonia or elsewhere,
returned to Kosovo.251 Consequently, KLA assumed power in the region after the Serbs’ fled.252
Moreover, despite the presence of KFOR, many KLA members conducted revenge attacks
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against Kosovo Serbs and “their allies.”253 Such revenge include ethnic cleansing and violent
retribution by the Kosovo-Albanians on the Gorani.254
In addition to acts of retribution against the Gorani, the Kosovo-Albanians took revenge
on the Circassians (Adyghe/Cherkess). The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo considered the
Circassians supportive of Serbs even though they too were Muslims just like the KosovoAlbanians.255 The Circassians therefore fled from Kosovo to Russia.256
Furthermore, in addition to using military force to remove the Gorani, the KosovoAlbanian leaders made efforts to repress the Gorani from speaking their native tongue. KosovoAlbanian leaders, banned language education in Serbian, and forbade the Gorani from speaking
Nashinski, a policy which the KLA enforced. 257 To the Kosovo-Albanians, speaking Serbian and
any language related to Serbian misrepresented of the Kosovo-Albanian dominance in Kosovo
and threatened the unity of Kosovo as an aspiring independent entity. 258
Finally, the Kosovo-Albanians continued to assert their dominance over Gorani territory.
In the course of the Kosovo War and subsequent peace-settlement process, Albanians occupied
the central municipal building of Gora in Dragash, declaring the re-establishment of the
Municipality of Dragash, a move which established Kosovo-Albanian political dominance over
the other ethnic groups living in the municipality. The Kosovo-Albanians encountered no
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resistance from KFOR and the rest of the international community, which empathized with the
Kosovo-Albanians’ plight in relation to the Serbs. The Gorani argued that this administrative
change was unfair after taking into account the other administrative changes which had occurred
in 1991 when the Kosovo-Albanians had aligned themselves de facto with the Municipality of
Prizren.259
However, the international community accepted the changes, which the Gorani claimed
was a violation of SCR 1244 and which favored the Kosovo-Albanians. The NATO KFOR
forces arrived too late to Dragash to counter the Albanian actions. The NATO force’s late arrival
opened the Gorani to having terrible experiences inflicted on them by the Kosovo-Albanians.
Kosovo-Albanian forces harassed and threatened the Gorani, forcing them to leave Dragash and
other parts of the Municipality of Gora. The Gorani people were afraid of losing their other
lands.260 Consequently, the Gorani found themselves totally isolated and disoriented having lost
control over the Municipality of Gora.261
In the years that followed, the Government of Kosovo, which was dominated by the
Kosovo-Albanians, further whittled away territory from the Gorani. The Kosovo government
again re-organized the municipalities which included the former Gora Region. Most importantly,
the Kosovo government separated the Opoje area from the Municipality of Dragash and placed it
within the Municipality of Prizren.
So why did the Serbs not repress the Gorani as they repressed the Bosniaks? First, the
Gorani and Serbs share mutually friendly views over the course of their histories. As Muharrem
Cufta states:
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“The Gorani people have had very good relations with the Serbs and it is still the
same. Because there were many families which were working and studying in the
Serbia, and currently there are still. The Gorani people were a people known for
being mostly friendly and well-adjusted among the people in the Yugoslavia. We
had the same education and lived under the same ceiling, and we are speaking the
same language with them (the Serbs). We did not have any problem with them.
Therefore, a state which started to fall apart, and everyone, naturally, defends
their homeland.”262
As Cufta stated, even though, the Gorani had different religious background then the Serbs , the
relations between the Gorani and the Serbs, unlike the Bosniaks, did not have any issues.
But the more important reason rests in the Gorani response to the disintegration of
Yugoslavia. Specifically, the Gorani reaction differed from that of the Bosniak brethren in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. First and foremost, the Gorani did not translate their ethnic identity into a
national identity and seek independence from Yugoslavia, their own separate republic, or even
autonomy within Serbia. According to Cufta, who is from Gora, unlike the Bosniaks, the Gorani
people did not aspire to independence from Serbia or seek to establish a state. They just aimed to
protect their property and the lands they worked.263 Rather, the Gorani remained content being an
ethnic group within the larger Serbian-dominated federation. Nor did they seek a national
presence in government. The Gorani desired only to have voice over policy within the Gora
region. As such, they did not incur the wrath of the Yugoslav military or the Kosovo-Serb
militias in the Gora and other neighboring regions. Rather, the Yugoslav military and Kosovo-
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Serb militias concentrated on protecting ethnic Serb communities in the broader region and
countering the Kosovo-Albanian forces seeking independence.
Further, unlike the Bosniaks, the Gorani did not define their identity based solely on their
religion to differentiate themselves from their Serb and Croat neighbors. As mentioned
previously, the Bosniak, Serb and Croat peoples all speak the essentially the same tongue, SerbCroatian. Religious affiliation is the primary trait which defines the differences between the
Bosniaks, the Serbs and Croatian.
And, finally, Gorani leaders, unlike their Bosniak counterparts, did not share a history of
politically mobilizing their followers based on religion. In the years preceding the outbreak of
conflict in Bosnia, Alija Izetbegovic, the individual who would become leader of the Bosniak
minorities in Bosnia, had advocated “the creation of a united Islamic community from Morocco
to Indonesia, in his Islamic Declaration of 1970.264 Izetbegovic, whose more clericalist views
caused more moderate Bosniak politicians to distance themselves from him, formed the Muslim
Party of Democratic Action (SDA) with goal of seeking independence from Yugoslavia.
Izetbegovic’s stance incited Serb political symbols of defend Christianity against Islam as well
as awakened associated Croat and Serb fears of being dominated by Muslims.
A consequence of Izetbegovic’s stance was Bosniak-Serbs but also Bosniak-Croats came
to view the Bosniaks as a threat to their immediate safety, if not a long-term threat to their
existence. As such, the Bosniak-Serbs and the Bosniak-Croats targeted Bosniak villages and
militias. The Bosniak-Croats only latter allied with the Bosniaks after international forces
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intervened and subsequent peace negotiations convinced them that unity against the Serbs
assisted in gaining political leverage with a unified Bosniak-Croat and Bosniak federation
against the Bosniak Serbs within a unified Bosnia-Herzegovina.
On the other hand, the Gorani approach to Islam and stance on independence neither
incited Serb nor Kosovo-Serb fears. But, it did reinforce ethnic Albanian prejudices that the
Gorani sympathized with the Serbs. As such, the Gorani provoked the ire of the KosovoAlbanians.
The Gorani stance around which they politically mobilized was rooted in the political
symbols rooted in their fear of Albanian domination. The Albanian policies of annexing Gorani
territories in the Opja region and historical efforts to minimize the Goranian language in relation
to the Albanian language precluded the Gorani as viewing the Kosovo-Albanians as allies,
despite their common religious beliefs. The Gorani thus chose not to ally with the KosovoAlbanians, again causing them to be treated as enemies to the Kosovo-Albanians whose
objective was seeking independence from Serbia.
Conclusion
The aim of this work was to answer the question of why did the Gorani, who are a
Muslim, Slavic group choose their Slavic roots over their religious roots shape their political
position during the Kosovo War? In other words, what elements of the Gorani shaped the Gorani
ethnic identity, and how did this identity play a role in the Gorani coming into opposition with
the Kosovo-Albanians, who are the predominantly Muslim? The research seems to indicate
Kaufman’s Symbolic Politics theory more than the other schools of ethnic mobilization offers
the best explanatory model. As a relatively small group, outnumbered in terms of population
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within the region and frequently under the sway of larger regional powers, the Gorani shaped
their identity on three elements. Of these three elements, only two, language and fear of the loss
of territory, however, defined the Gorani political symbolic myths which caused them not to side
with Kosovo-Albanians in opposing the ethnic Serbs in the Kosovo-Albanian effort to gain
independence for Kosovo.
The first element, in terms of the Gorani ethnic identity, is their religion which is Islam,
which sets them apart from the Serbs, who are Orthodox. The Gorani interpretation of Islam also
differs from the Kosovo-Albanian interpretation of Islam. Although both the Gorani and the
Kosovo-Albanians are Sunni Muslims, the Gorani interpretation of Islam incorporates elements
of their Bogumul heritage. The Kosovo-Albanian interpretation derives much from the influence
of the Bektashi tradition.
Even so, neither the Gorani nor the Kosovo-Albanians used religion to define “in-groups”
and “out-groups” vis-à-vis one another during the Kosovo War. The Kosovo-Albanians, similar
to their Albanian nationalist brethren who unified Albanian Catholics, Albanian Orthodox and
Albanian Muslims against the Orthodox Serbs to gain independence for Albania, downplayed
religion among themselves. In creating a truly Albanian identity, Albanian nationalists
emphasized other elements of their ethnicity to create a nation-state. Likewise, KosovoAlbanians chose not to stress their common Muslim roots with the Gorani. The Gorani too, for
who typically only use religion when defining their identity vis-à-vis ethnic Slavs, did not find
religion as touching the emotions necessary to define their identity in relation to the KosovoAlbanians as sufficient to provoke a sense of unity among the Gorani. Thus, while religion is
important to the Gorani identity, the Gorani did not stress religion and did not find religion as a
source of common identity with their religious kin, the Kosovo-Albanian during the conflict.
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Another significant factor in the creation of ethnic identity of the Gorani is language.
Even though, existence of the various arguments about similarities between the Serbian and the
Nashinski or between the Macedonian and the Nashinski, the Gorani have been able protect their
native language due to mountainous geography and other factors. And unlike religion, language
became a unifying element for the Gorani and Kosovo-Albanians in defining their separate
ethnic identities. In the Albanian case, language was a common element among Albanians who
had religiously different backgrounds. Thus, Albanian nationalist unified Albanian Muslims and
the Albanian Christians occurred based on them all speaking Albanian. Albanian nationalist
achieved independence as a nation-state by uniting Albanian speakers against non-Albanian
speakers. There is, in the Albanian mind, success in achieving political objectives in using
language as a unifying factor in forming both an ethnic identity as well as national unity.
Kosovo-Albanians thus made efforts to repress the Gorani from speaking Nashinski
because Nashinski was not Albanian but more because Nashinski was a Slavic language akin to
the language of the Kosovo-Albanians’ main political adversary, the ethnic Serbs. Especially
during the Kosovo War, Kosovo Albanians attempted to ban Nashinski and years thereafter have
advocated policies to adopt Bosnian. The Gorani clung then and still do cling to Nashinski as
differentiating themselves, even from the Bosniaks who, though less than the Kosovo-Albanians,
too represent a threat to their separate ethnic identity.
Last but not least, another significant component of the Gorani ethnic identity is territory.
Historically, the Gora Region expands currently three country lands, Kosovo, Albania, and
Macedonia. The fear of losing territory can be interpreted via the Instrumentalist approach along
with the Symbolic Politics theory as well. According to the Instrumentalist approach, people
mobilize in order to gain economic benefits. Based on the school of thought perspective, the
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Gorani wanted defense their land, where they earn their life. Keep in mind that, the Gora Region
is mountainous, hence, many of the Gorani’s occupation was animal husbandry or farming.
Therefore, the Gorani tried to keep their land in order to maintain their status stable.
But, through the perspective of the Symbolic Politics theory, land is not only place in
which you can live and spend time on it. Territory also has the symbolic elements rooted in
emotions. Territory represents historical heritage. Rationally, using the logic of the
Instrumentalist, people could substitute one piece of land for another, especially if the land
provides equal or better economic benefit. But, land often represents more than a mere place
where people derive their incomes and well-being. Land is also tied to people’s memories/ It is
the place they inherited from their ancestors and where their ancestors gave birth, raised their
children, and ultimately rest after a life lived. Land is where the younger generations go to
remember the older generations, pay them homage, and feel their presence even though they are
no longer alive in body. Land is meaningful to people it is linked to their memories, their
heritage.
The history demonstrates how larger politically dominant ethnic groups, primarily the
Albanians, have shrunk the Gora Region and it divided it up with political borders, notably when
Albania and Macedonia gained their independence. The Gorani lost even more territory and
more importantly political control of Gorani territory first in 1991 when the Kosovo-Albanians
in Opolje aligned themselves with the Municipality of Prizren. And it occurred again in 1999
with the division of the former Municipality of Gora when the Kosovo-Albanian political leaders
divided the Municipality into Municipality of Opolje, which was northern part of the
Municipality Dragash, and the Municipality of Gora. In all cases, ethnic Albanian political
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policies and decisions reduced the Gorani political influence to determine their own destiny. The
Gorani dominance over their land, as much as it had existed previously, waned even further.
In addition to the political division of the Gorani lands is the threat of migration. Other
ethnic groups, e.g. the Kosovo-Albanians and the Bosniaks, have come to populate the Gora
Region and outnumber the Gorani in certain areas. Of the two groups, the Kosovo-Albanians and
the Bosniaks, the Kosovo-Albanian have posed the single most pressing threat to the Gorani
control of their own land. Albanianization of the Gorani settlements started in 1960s. After the
creation of the Municipality of Opolje, there was an increase in the Kosovo-Albanian population
moving into the area. The Gorani again lost land and influence as the Kosovo-Albanian surged.
The fear of losing territory to the Kosovo-Albanians was a real threat to the Gorani. This
fear of losing territory became an important element, a symbol of ethnic unity, among the
Gorani. During the Kosovo War, the Gorani took such a position in which they could protect
their historical heritage from the Kosovo-Albanian encroachment of the Gorani lands.
According to the Gorani’s position during the Kosovo War can be comprehended that the
Gorani aimed to protect their territory and maintain their native language. However, if the Gorani
had strictly sided with the Serbs, they would have been persecuted by the nationalist KLA
soldiers. The consequences of openly siding with the Serb would have likely been even more
repressive, even more brutal than that which did actually occur. Therefore, during the war, the
Gorani people shaped their political identity selectively and politically mobilized accordingly,
first placing primacy on protecting their homeland and on the uniqueness of their language.
From a theoretical perspective, the Gorani case expands and clarifies Kaufman’s
explanation of the role of Symbolic Politics in understanding ethnic mobilization. The Gorani
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case shows that a group may choose to place different emphasis on the elements around which
they have their political symbols depending on which other ethnicity they want identify as the
out-group. In their shaping their identity vis-à-vis the ethnic Serbs, Bulgarians and Macedonians,
the Gorani place greater emphasis on their Muslim heritage, an element which unifies them with
their Bosniak neighbors. However, in shaping their identity in their relations with ethnic
Albanians and, even the Bosniaks, the Gorani place greater emphasis on the uniqueness of their
language. The third element, defense of their territory, remains the common thread in their
relations with all ethnic groups. However, in terms of being the single unifying element of the
Gorani political symbols, defense of territory is not sufficient in and of itself. The most likely
explanation, one for further research, is politically mobilizing based solely in regaining or
protecting territory is not practically feasible. Doing so would place them at odds simultaneously
with the Bosniaks and the Kosovo-Albanians. Being relatively so few in number, the Gorani
could not pursue policies, violent or non-violent, to protect their lands in the face of a unity of
Kosovo-Albanians and Bosniaks against them.
The political symbols for an ethnic group are not constant, contrary to what Kaufman
asserts. Political symbols, at least the relative importance of elements composing a people’s
ethnic identity, are fluid relative to which out-group poses the greatest threat to an in-group’s
continued existence. A political myth used to define identity and to mobilize against one threat
do not suffice against a different threat.
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APPENDIX A:

Figure1: People’s Mobilization based on rational or emotional choices.
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APPENDIX B: MAPS

Figure 1: Political Map of Kosovo (2009)
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Figure 2: Map of the Gora Region
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Figure 3: Physical Map of Gora Region (2009) (Not including regions annexed by Albania in 1912).
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Figure 4: Kosovo Ethnic Diversity Map (Published January 2008)
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Figure 5: The Municipalities of Opoje and Dragash

Figure 6: The Municipality of Prizren and The District of Prizren
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